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1  Overview 
KIMOD 1.0 is an annual large-scale macroeconomic model
2 of the Swedish economy 
and is the result of a project that started in 2002 at the National Institute of Eco-
nomic Research (NIER) in Sweden. In 2003, the model was used for the first time in 
policy analysis (see NIER, 2003) and from 2004 onwards it has also been applied for 
forecasting purposes. In November 2005, the time had come to document the first 
official version of the model, KIMOD 1.0. This document is a resulting part of the 
documentation project.  
In this first chapter, the reader is introduced to the main features of the model (sec-
tions 1.1 to 1.4). This description includes the purpose of the model, the basic model 
structure, some key design features as well as the relationship with other large-scale 
macroeconomic models. Finally, in section 1.5, the structure of this documentation is 
outlined. 
1.1  The purpose of KIMOD  
The NIER publishes projections of the Swedish and international economy four times 
a year. In addition, the NIER continuously identifies and analysis policy issues that 
are important to the Swedish economy (see, e.g., NIER, 2005).  
KIMOD is designed for both policy analysis and projection purposes. The model’s 
comparative advantage is on the policy side. The reason is that it incorporates major 
parts of the Swedish economy, it is based on solid theoretical foundations, it keeps 
track of stocks and flows and it respects national account identities. As such, the 
model allows us to ask economically relevant questions (e.g. “what will happen with 
the real exchange rate if the Swedes start to consume more?”), let the model has it 
say, and trace out the theoretical underpinnings of the answer. Indeed, the model 
ensures that there are no “free lunches” and that all stocks and flows add up in a 
consistent manner. It thus relaxes the pressure on economists to keep a model of the 
                                     
2 The term “large-scale macroeconomic model” is used for describing the class of models KIMOD be-
longs to (see section 1.4 for examples of similar models in use around the world). There is, however, no 
formal definition of this term. In the context in which KIMOD operates, the expression could be said 
to stand for theory-based general equilibrium models which incorporate the major markets (goods, 
labour, and financial markets) and agents (firms, households, government, central bank, and a foreign 
sector) of an economy.  
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entire economy in their minds! Instead, economists have the model explicitly in front 
of them which often is a requirement for a fruitful discussion and sensible decisions. 
Although large-scale macroeconomic models can be helpful for projection purposes, 
they are usually not well adapted to incorporate the latest real time data such as con-
fidence indicators, investment and employment plans etc. For example, a model with 
a generally specified consumption function is often too restrictive for a consumption 
expert who also has access to the latest information on consumer confidence indica-
tors and household’s investment plans. A good model can and should, however, be an 
important contribution to the overall projection process. KIMOD is designed to serve 
as such a model. 
KIMOD has, however, one comparative advantage in the projection process; the pos-
sibility of carrying out so-called alternative scenarios. In other words, the model can 
take as its starting point the projection suggested by the sector experts, and then let 
a variable (such as e.g. oil prices) take a different route, and trace out the effects on 
the other variables. For example, the model can incorporate the full projection of the 
Swedish economy for the period 2006–2008, assign alternative values for the oil price 
2006–2008, and generate a fully fledged alternative scenario for all model variables. 
This operation can be both quickly and consistently performed by the model group as 
compared to the necessary interaction and recalculation that otherwise would have to 
be carried out by the sector experts.  
In summary, we believe that KIMOD is well adapted to both the policy and the pro-
jection environments of the NIER. 
1.2  The use of models at the NIER  
KIMOD is the only large-scale macroeconomic model at the NIER. Until now, differ-
ent small-scale macroeconomic models have been used to analyze various issues. For 
example, the Öller and Tallbom (1996) model is frequently used for analyzing busi-
ness cycle turning points. KLEM is a small open-economy model based on Svensson 
(2000) and is mainly used for analyzing macroeconomic effects of monetary policy. 
The unobservable components model of Apel and Jansson (1999) and the structural 
vector autoregression model of Fabiani et al (2000) have been used to estimate the 
NAIRU for Sweden. For short-run GDP forecasting, the quarterly model by Jansson, 
Hansson and Löf (2005) is applied.  
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The purpose of KIMOD is not to be a substitute for these small-scale models, for sev-
eral reasons. Although small-scale models only deal with a partial analysis of the 
economy, they are often very good at doing their specific job. For example, the busi-
ness cycle turning point model by Öller and Tallbom (1996) includes much more spe-
cific business cycle information, such as various types of indicators, than what would 
be feasible in a large-scale model. Another example is the purely data-driven forecast-
ing model by Jansson, Hansson and Löf (2005) or, for developments in public fi-
nances, the accounting model FIMO.  
  
In short, different small-scale macroeconomic models will still be used at the NIER to 
complement KIMOD.  
1.3  KIMOD – a brief overview 
KIMOD can be situated within the synthesis of neoclassical and neokeynesian models. 
The neoclassical features dominate in the longer run (say 7–15 years) and constitute 
the core theory of the model. In the long run, prices are fully flexible and agents are 
fully rational. This implies that the economic variables based on the core theory gen-
erally responds very quickly to shocks.
3 Such responses are not intended to represent 
the actual behaviour of the Swedish economy in the short run. Rather, the core the-
ory serves to generate a realistic and consistent long run behaviour of the economy.  
In the short run (say 1–6 years), neokeynesian nominal rigidities stemming from im-
perfect information, bounded rationality and adjustment costs become operative. The 
nominal rigidities imply that volume variables such as production and employment 
respond sluggishly to shocks so that the model can realistically mimic the business 
cycle dynamics of the Swedish economy.  
In section 1.3.3, the economics of KIMOD is discussed in more detail. First, however, 
section 1.3.1 describes in general terms our strategy of merging neoclassical core the-
ory and neokeynesian business cycle theory within one model structure. 
                                     
3 There are two real rigidities – a search cost in the labour market and an installation cost of invest-
ment – included in the core theory. These rigidities imply that, despite fully flexible prices and fully 
rational agents, it takes some time for the economy to reach a new long run equilibrium after a shock.   
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1.3.1  Three models in one 
KIMOD consists of three separate, although highly interrelated, models. Simplifying 
somewhat, we could say that the three models are valid at different time horizons. In 
the (very) long run, when the effects of nominal and real rigidities have faded out, 
the values of the variables are the same across the three models. 
The Steady state model is a static model based on the neoclassical theory of consump-
tion, investment, production, and the labour market. In steady state, all real vari-
ables, such as GDP, consumption, and investments grow at the same rate, which im-
plies that, for example, the consumption-GDP ratio is constant.
4 Moreover, the 
steady state model is a pure real model, in that there are no nominal prices, nominal 
interest rates or nominal exchange rates, only relative prices, real interest rates, and a 
real exchange rate. These are all constant in steady state, which implicitly implies 
that all nominal prices grow at the same rate. 
The second part of KIMOD is the Flex-price model. Prices and wages are fully flexi-
ble and all agents are fully rational and have perfect foresight. Obviously, the Steady 
state model is the static version of the Flex-price model. The dynamics are mostly 
due to the introduction of two real rigidities, one in the capital market and one in the 
labour market. In the capital market, there are adjustment costs to investments. This 
implies that the capital stock adjusts only gradually to a changed economic environ-
ment, i.e. a change in the steady state. The labour market is modelled as in Pis-
sarides (2000). Vacancy costs imply that employers hoard labour if a fall in demand 
is not permanent. Equilibrium unemployment is determined by replacement ratios, 
separation rates, vacancy costs, matching efficiency as well as other variables incor-
porated insearch theory.  
In practical applications, KIMOD shares the same equilibrium values of for example 
output, unemployment and the real exchange rate used elsewhere at the NIER. It is 
not likely, though, that all the variables in the economy initially take their flex-price 
equilibrium values. The time it takes for them to reach the flex-price counterparts is, 
however, less than it takes to reach the steady state. In absence of shocks, the econ-
                                     
4 The steady state condition that all real variables grow at the same rate derives from the one-good-
assumption, which obviously is not fulfilled in reality. The most obvious example is the heterogenous 
growth of the private and public sectors, respectively, where former grows faster than the latter. The 
problem of imposing the same growth rate is, however, not severe in the use of the model. For projec-
tion purposes, the problem is reduced by letting the steady state restrictions only be restrictive far 
away (say 2030) from the projection period.   
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omy should normally reach the flex-price equilibrium within 5–10 years. We empha-
size that the flex-price equilibrium reaches the steady state only after the effects of 
the real rigidities in the markets for capital and labour have faded out.  
The third and final part of KIMOD is the Sticky-price model. Here, nominal rigidities 
in prices and wages are introduced which lead to sluggish volume adjustment. The 
nominal rigidities stem from the presence of imperfect information and bounded ra-
tionality. This implies, for example, that consumers, investors, and wage setters are 
partially backward looking; expectations are partly adaptive. As time goes by after a 
shock, however, the agents learn and become more informed. As a result, variables 
adjust gradually towards their flex-price equilibrium values. The nominal rigidities 
give room for stabilization policies, such as monetary and fiscal policies, wich aim to 
move the economy in the direction of the flex-price equilibrium. It is important to 
stress, though, that stabilization policies can not alter any equilibrium values. For 
projection purposes, the Sticky-price model variables start in actual data, i.e. the 
data used elsewhere at the NIER.  
                         Fig 1:  Different frequencies in KIMOD 
 
Figure 1 gives an example in order to illustrate the differences between these con-
cepts. For any stationary variable,  t U , there is an anticipated permanent shift in  
 
10
2007 in its  steady state value, displayed by the US S − path. The time variant flex-
price analogue, UF P − , converges eventually on the steady state path while the busi-
ness cycle counterpart, US P − , starting in observed data, UD A T − , oscillates somewhat 
more before converging upon the long run equilibrium.   
 
1.3.2  Permanent and temporary shocks 
The three models in KIMOD – Steady state, Flex-price, and Sticky-price – can also 
be understood in the light of permanent and temporary shocks. By definition, a tem-
porary shock only affects the Sticky Price model and does not alter any flex-price or 
steady state values. For example, a rise in world oil prices that is assumed to be of 
temporary nature, will affect prices and volumes in the short run (i.e. in the Sticky-
price model) while equilibrium values in the Steady state and Flex-price models are 
unaltered. 
On the other hand a permanent rise in the world oil price might affect equilibrium 
values of output, relative prices, terms of trade and the real exchange rate. A perma-
nent shock must therefore be introduced both in the Steady state and Flex-price 
model, as well as in the Sticky-price model. In practice, a permanent shock is first 
introduced in the Steady state model to describe the new static long run equilibrium. 
This will give rise to a set of terminal conditions which, in turn, are introduced to the 
Flex-price model generating a dynamic (due to real rigidities) flex-price equilibrium 
path to the new steady state. Finally, the shock is introduced in the Sticky-price 
model. As the new equlibrium paths mentioned above are exogenous to the Sticky-
price model this will give rise to a business cycle response and show how, through the 
help of stabilization policies, the economy reaches the new flex-price equilibrium.  
Effects of permanent and temporary shocks will be examined in chapter 5. 
1.3.3  The economic structure of KIMOD 
KIMOD contains the main economic variables in the Swedish economy, such as nomi-
nal and real GDP as well as its components, employment, vacancies, wages, interest 
rates, and exchange rates. The set of agents include individuals, firms, a central bank, 
a government, a foreign sector and the different markets include goods, labour, capi-
tal, and financial markets.  
Consumption: In the Steady state and Flex-price models, consumers maximize their 
life time utility and smooth their consumption due to a decreasing marginal utility of  
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consumption. In each period they consume a fraction of the discounted life time 
wealth and save by buying international bonds or domestic stocks. In the short run 
(i.e. in the Sticky-price model), a fraction of the consumers are liquidity constrained 
(see Campbell and Mankiw, 1991) which, together with uncertainty, affects their con-
sumption decision.  
Production: In the Steady state and Flex-price models, firms maximize profits by hir-
ing homogenous labour and capital services. In the long run, growth of production 
equals the sum of the rates of growth in labour supply and labour-augmenting techni-
cal change in productivity. This (intermediate) output is used, together with im-
ported intermediate goods to generate consumption, investment, and export goods. In 
the short run, firms are uncertain about demand and form expectations about future 
values which affect their employment and pricing decisions. Moreover, in the short 
run, firms’ investment decisions depend on lagged profits.  
Labour market: In the labour market, unemployed workers bargain with firms over 
wages according to a Nash bargaining game (Pissarides, 2000). In this process, factors 
such as the replacement ratio, vacancy costs, the separation rate and relative bar-
gaining strength determine the outcome. The number of successful matches is deter-
mined by a matching function. In the short run, (i.e. in the Sticky-price model) the 
outcome of the bargain also depends on lagged wages as well as expectations about 
future wages as well as companies pricing behaviour and expected monetary policy.  
Government: The government produces output by buying labour services at a wage 
that is not necessarily equal to the wage in the business sector. The government also 
purchases goods produced by the business sector. In addition to the expenditure on 
wages and goods, the government pays transfers to households and unemployment 
benefits. On the revenue side, the government collects indirect taxes, labour related 
taxes and taxes on dividends. A fiscal policy rule assures that a long run debt-to-
GDP target is reached.  
Monetary policy: An independent central bank is responsible for the monetary policy. 
According to the central bank’s reaction function the nominal interest rate is set to 
steer inflation towards the inflation target. As nominal prices are sticky in the short 
run, the central bank can influence the real interest rate. The real interest rate, in 
turn, affects consumption and investment decisions as well as the real exchange rate 
(and thereby net exports). The time it takes to reach the target inflation depends on 
the initial state and on the specific shocks that have hit the economy.  
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Financial markets: The bond market is assumed to be international whereas the stock 
market is national. The real interest rate of the Steady state and Flex-prices models 
is determined by the rest of the world and thus exogenous. The real exchange rate 
model is based on Nilsson (2004), in which the real exchange rate in equilibrium de-
pends on relative productivity, terms of trade as well as net foreign assets. In the 
short run, real exchange rate is determined by the uncovered real interest parity con-
dition and, therefore, by the monetary policy stance.   
Expectations: In the Steady state and Flex-price models, expectations are rational 
and agents have perfect foresight. In the Sticky-price model, expectations are par-
tially rational and partial backward looking. The agents learn, however, as time goes 
by after a shock, and they gradually become better informed. For example, if there is 
a permanent productivity shock, firms and employees are at first uncertain as to 
whether the shock is temporary or permanent. However, the longer the time gone by 
after the shock, the more have agents learnt about its nature. They can thereby 
gradually formulate more accurate expectations which guide their decisions.  
The core theory of the Steady state and Flex-price models is described in chapter 2 
and the business cycle theory of the Sticky-price model is described in chapter 3.  
1.3.4  Key design features of KIMOD  
As described in section 1.1 above, KIMOD’s two major purposes are to provide a tool 
for policy analysis and projection. As mentioned, policy analysis is the most impor-
tant of the two because KIMOD has a clear comparative advantage in this area. A 
closely related issue is the maxim “system goes first”, which has been a leading prin-
ciple in the development of KIMOD. By this we mean that it is more important that 
the whole system of equations and variables behaves well than it is to maximize the 
projection accuracy of single variables, such as consumption growth. Consider again 
the example of the permanent productivity shock. It is of greatest importance that 
KIMOD can tell a reliable story of how the effects are spread throughout the econ-
omy and how they affect steady state values, short run exchange rates, wage bargain-
ing, employment, central bank actions, the government budget balance and other 
relevant variables. The reason is that such complicated scenarios can neither be in-
cluded in small-scale macroeconomic models, nor in any one’s mind.  
Adhering to the “system goes first” principle, the purpose of economic projection 
needs to be fulfilled in a reasonable way. This is partly achieved by estimating con-
sumption, export and investment equations and by including them in the Sticky-price  
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model. Moreover, the expectation formation has to be calibrated so that the model’s 
response to short run shocks be plausible. A detailed discussion of the models re-
sponses to permanent and temporary shocks is described in chapter 5. 
KIMOD is also designed to respect the major definitions and identities of the Na-
tional Accounts. Whenever possible, KIMOD uses the same definitions for output, 
consumption, prices, wages, exchange rates etc. as the rest of the NIER. KIMOD also 
keeps track of stock-flow dynamics. For example, investment flows builds the capital 
stock, the current account balance builds the Swedish net foreign asset position, gov-
ernment budget balance builds the government debt etc. In short, KIMOD is built so 
that there are neither “leaks” nor “free lunches” in the economy and economic and 
national accounts identities are satisfied. 
Finally, KIMOD is solved using the Troll modelling language. Although there are 
several other possible software products on the market, Troll is well suited to solve 
large, non-linear, forward looking models. 
1.4  Relationship with other large-scale macroeconomic models  
KIMOD is built in the spirit of a model framework that was initiated and imple-
mented in the mid 1990s. The QPM model developed by the Bank of Canada has 
been a role model that has inspired many others (Black et al, 1994). Examples in-
clude the FPS model of Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Black et al, 1997), RIXMOD 
of Bank of Sweden (Karlsson, 1998), the FRB model of the Federal Reserve in US 
(Brayton and Tinsley, 1996), MULTIMOD Mark III of the IMF (Laxton et al, 1998), 
and BEQM of Bank of England (Harrison et al, 2005).  
The models (including KIMOD) within this tradition all share the objective of theo-
retical consistency, a well-defined steady state, a rational expectations equilibrium in 
the long run and a variety of neokeynesian rigidities in the short run. Although the 
overall structure of the models mentioned above is similar, there are of course theo-
retical differences both in the core theory part and in the business cycle theory part. 
Examples of the former are different production functions, utility functions, and the 
modelling of the labour market. The differences in the short run behaviour of the 
model might be even greater, since short run dynamics often depend on estimated 
equations and calibration based on historical information which differs substantially 
between countries.   
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However, the similarities between the models become striking when one examine so-
called standard shocks such as productivity, taste, and wage shocks. Since the theo-
retical structures are similar, the models often imply the same direction and the same 
sign of the responses to these shocks, especially in the medium and long run. As a 
result, they all tell the same qualitative story, i.e. the economics of the model re-
sponses are the same. Of course, they differ somewhat in the short run, partly due to 
country-specific short run calibration.  
As mentioned, these models are based on work that began in the mid 1990s. In recent 
years, a number of models have been developed that aim to take these models a bit 
further, see TOTEM (Murchison and Rennison, Bank of Canada, 2006), AINO (Kil-
ponen et al, Bank of Finland, 2004), Smets and Wouters (2003) or Adolfsson et al 
(2005) The aim in this line of research is to introduce more rigidities (and thereby 
dynamics) within the theory-based core model and, as a result, rely less on ad hoc 
short run dynamics.  
1.5  The structure of this documentation 
The rest of this document is organized as follows: 
Core theory (chapter 2) In this chapter, the main steady state and flex-price equa-
tions are discussed. The subsections include consumption (including the external sec-
tor), production, labour market, and government.  
Business cycle theory (chapter 3) In this chapter, the most important Sticky-price 
model equations are discussed. Estimated equations are presented in some detail. The 
subsections include volumes, prices, monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the formation 
of expectations. 
Calibration (chapter 4) In this chapter, the principles behind the calibration are dis-
cussed. 
Dynamic model properties (chapter 5) In this chapter, a number of permanent and 
temporary shocks (see section 1.3.2 for a definition) are reported. The responses to 
these shocks display the economics of the model, and we relate the effects to the core 
and business cycle theories outlined in chapters 2 and 3.  
Appendix: Graphs and variable list (chapter 5) In this section graphical illustrations 
of the shocks discussed in the preceding chapter are displayed and a complete list of 




In addition to this document, a similar but more detailed version has been written, 
aimed for internal use. It includes more details of the derivations of the model’s equa-
tions, useful for the future development of KIMOD. This internal documentation is 
available on request. 
Furthermore, the documentation project also includes a User guide, available to those 
who want to run the model in practice. It aims to give a “hands on” description of 
how to use KIMOD in the Troll modelling language. The subsections include Troll 
commands, policy analysis, data management, and presentation of results. The User 
guide is written in Swedish and is available upon request.  
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2  Core theory 
One of the key features of KIMOD is that it should be based on robust theory. This 
is especially important for the long-run and equilibrium properties of the model. In 
practice, this means that the behavioural equations of the Steady-state and the Flex-
price models are derived from mainstream macroeconomic theory. This chapter pre-
sents the theories involved. The assumptions underlying individual consumer behav-
iour are presented in section 2.1, which yield equations for aggregate consumption 
demand and wealth dynamics. The theoretical labour market model is set up in sec-
tion 2.2, which, together with the private production properties discussed in section 
2.3, determines employment and wage setting behaviour as well as investment deci-
sions. The modelling of public sector production and consumption are presented in 
section 2.4, where we also discuss the aims of fiscal policy. Finally, the equations de-
scribing the interaction with the external sector are derived in section 2.5. 
2.1  Consumer behaviour 
The model of consumer behaviour presented below is based on the overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) model by Blanchard (1985).
5 Finite lives are introduced in a very 
flexible way, making the model well suited for economic policy analysis. For example, 
the model allows for deviations from Ricardian equivalence which implies that fiscal 
policy can have real effects. Moreover, the OLG framework allows countries to have 
different relationships between subjective discount factors and real interest rates. As 
a result, a country can be a net debtor or a net creditor which, for example, deter-
mines trade flows in steady state.  
In Blanchard’s model, one new generation (consisting of a certain number of indi-
viduals) is “born” each period, while some individuals within each generation die. 
When a new generation is “born”, it directly enters the workforce. There are no ex-
plicit formulations for pensioners, students, and people on leave.
 6  
                                     
5 Blanchard (1985) based his continuous time overlapping generation framework on Yaari (1965). Our 
model follows the discrete time framework by Frenkel and Razin (1996). See also Buiter (1988) and 
Weil (1989) for similar models with some extensions.  
6 In the literature, this kind of OLG model is sometimes called “perpetual youth” model.  
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All individuals within a generation are assumed to be identical. Thus, we can solve 
the individual’s optimization problem, derive the consumption function and then ag-
gregate it over the generation as well as over the entire economy.  
Individuals maximize their expected lifetime utility. They face one uncertainty; they 
do not know when they will die. Following Blanchard (1985), a constant probability 
of death is assumed to affects many aspects of the solution. Furthermore, labour sup-
ply is assumed to be exogenous. Hence, an individual does not choose between work 
and leisure. The individual’s real choice each period instead consists only of how 
much to consume and how much to save out of his/hers expected life time wealth.  
The population dynamics of the present version of KIMOD, are presented in section 
2.1.1. A brief presentation of the different steps involved in the derivation of the ag-
gregated consumption function is given. Individual preferences and the associated 
utility function are described in section 2.1.2. The intertemporal budget constraint is 
described in section 2.1.3, and various wealth measures are discussed in section 2.1.4. 
The dynamic solution of the optimization problem is presented in section 2.1.5, and 
the individual’s optimal consumption, as a function of total wealth, is derived in sec-
tion 2.1.6. Finally aggregation is described in sections 2.1.7 and 2.1.8. 
2.1.1  Population dynamics 
An individual is either employed or unemployed. The total population is then simply 
equal to the sum of the individuals in the working population, aged between 16 and 
64, and equal to the labour supply (LS ). The flows into and out from the population 
are exogenously given. A new generation of individuals enters the working population 
each year, and a fraction of the old population exit. 
Formally, a share 1 π −  of each generation exit each year. If  1 π = , then individuals 
would expect to survive each period and the planning horizon becomes infinite. In 
other cases, the expected remaining life time for an individual is finite and given by 
1/(1 ) π − , i.e. 25 years if  0.96 π =  (a reasonable number for Sweden). 
The number of “births” of individuals in a new generation is assumed to be propor-
tional to the old population. Let a denote the exogenous birth rate, in terms of those 
surviving from last period (i.e.  1 t LS π − ).  
Summing up, the population in period t consists of (i) those individuals in the old 
generations who survive between period  1 t −  and t, and (ii) the new generation en-





























=+  (2.2) 
2.1.2  Preferences and the utility function  
Since labour supply is exogenous, leisure is not an argument of the utility function. 
An individual receives utility solely from consumption. The instantaneous utility 
function is logarithmic, which implies that income and substitution effects of a 
change in the interest rate cancel out. The interest rate, however, will change the 
present value of labour income and the human capital wealth which, in turn, affects 
the optimal path for consumption (i.e., the wealth effect remains). 
Since there is a probability of exit, the expected utility of individual i evaluated in 




























The effective (and subjective) discount factor (πβ ) consists of two parts. Parameter 
β  is the pure subjective discount factor. The individual prefers consumption this 
year instead of next year, so that 01 β <<  holds. The lower the probability of surviv-
ing until the next period (π ), the more the individual prefers consumption this year 
compared to next year. In other words, we can incorporate the idea of an impatient 
individual. As we will see, the finitely lived individual consumes more out of his/her 
wealth compared to a model with an infinite horizon (in which  1 π = ), since the effec-
tive planning horizon is shorter. 
2.1.3  The individual’s intertemporal budget constraint 
Each individual in KIMOD is an amalgam that represents private employees, public 
employees, the unemployed, as well as bond and share holders. The budget con- 
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straint, in real terms, of a representative individual in generation i in period t is thus 
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 (2.5) 
In these equations, 
_ ,
CP
t P  
_ ,
PMP
t P  and 
_ YPG P
t PB  are the relative prices of consumption, 
imports and private production vis-à-vis the GDP-deflator (P ). The left hand side of 
(2.4) consists of consumption expenditure (C ) during the period and the value of 
shares (of aggregated equities) (
iV φ ) and bonds (B ) at the end of the period. The 
individual’s average wage rate, denoted by 
, ,
iA




t W ), the real wage in the government sector and unemployment bene-
fits. It is a weighted average, where the weights are equal to shares of total hours 
supplied by the individual (
i
t LH ), see equation (2.5). The government wage rate is a 
fraction (α ) of the private sector wage rate and the same is true for unemployment 
benefits, the level of which is effectively defined by the replacement ratio (ζ ).The 
right hand side of (2.4) thus consists of working income from hours spent in private 
employment (
, iP
t LH ), government employment (
, iG
t LH ), and income generated by 
hours in unemployment (
i
t UH ). The individual also receives government transfer 
payments (TR), interest on bonds (R B ⋅ ) and dividends (D). The individuals pay 
income taxes on labour and capital, represented by 
W
t τ  and 
D
t τ . Furthermore, on the 
right hand side of (2.4) we include the value of the bonds and stocks at the beginning 
of the period, denoted with subscript “ 1 t − ”. 
The stock market is domestic while the bond market is international. The value of 
bonds is translated into Swedish crowns by using the import deflator (
M
t P ). Note 
that the returns on bonds, dividends, bond holdings and the share of stocks are di-
vided by π . This stems from the introduction of finite lives (or, equally, the constant 
probability of death) in the model. The survivors inherit the financial assets, which 
                                     
7 The real wage is measured in units of private (gross) production, 
_ P YPG P WP  is the real wage in 
terms of GDP.  
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increases their income and wealth. For example, the total rate of return on bonds 
between period t–1 and t is  1 t R −  while the effective rate for the individual is 
1 (1 ) / 1 t R π − +− , where  11 (1 ) / 1 tt R R π −− +− >  if  1 π < . 
2.1.4  The stock measures of total, human, and financial wealth  
There are several wealth measures in KIMOD; human (capital) wealth, financial 
wealth and their sum, total wealth. Total wealth (TW ) is simply measured as the 
expected present value of consumption expenditures, given any consumption path. 
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or, in other words, the discounted real value of future consumption possibilities.
8 A 
lower probability of surviving or a higher real interest rate implies a lower weight on 
future consumption. By substituting consumption as given by the budget constraint 
(2.4) into (2.6), we can separate this expression into two parts. Human wealth (HW ) 
is defined as the part associated with labour income, while the rest is defined as fi-
nancial wealth. Financial wealth, in turn, is the sum of bond wealth (BW ) and stock 
wealth (SW ), so that 
  .
ii i i
tt t t TW HW BW SW =++ (2.7) 
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8 The effective discount rate is equal to the individual’s average effective rate on return on bonds, so 
that the uncertainty of one’s lifetime is taken into account. The probability of “being alive” in period s 
for the individuals in period t is  12
s t
tt s ππ ππ
−
++ ⋅⋅ ⋅ = … , and the average annual interest rate is equal 
to  () 11
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Current human wealth is thus equal to this period’s labour income and transfer pay-
ments, plus the expected discounted value of next period’s human wealth. The hu-
man wealth expression is thus forward looking, which implies that total wealth is also 
forward looking.  
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where a solvency requirement is assumed to hold, so that ()
_, /(1 ) 0
t MP P i
tt RP B π +=  as 
t →∞. Individuals are not allowed to expect a nonzero debt in the long run. The in-
terpretation of equation (2.9) is that the expected value of bond wealth is equal to 
the value of today’s bond holdings.  
Since there is no financial risk in KIMOD, the return on shares must equal the return 
on bonds, i.e.  t R . This non-arbitrage condition gives the following dynamic path of 
the value of the total number of shares, that is, the value of the firm (see section 2.3 
below): 
  11 1 (1 ) (1 ) .
D
tt t t t VD R V τ ++ + +− =+  (2.10) 
Equation (2.10) is derived using the fact that the return on shares stems from two 
sources; dividends and changes in the market value of the firm (V ). Assuming a con-
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∑
 (2.11) 
where  () /(1 ) 0
t i
tt RV πφ +=  as t →∞ is assumed. Similarly to bond wealth, the ex-
pected stock wealth is defined as the value of the shares in the beginning of the pe-
riod plus dividends that accrue during the period. Note that there is no forward lock-
ing part in neither the bond wealth nor the stock wealth. This implies that there is 
no forward looking part in the financial wealth, only in the human capital wealth.  
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2.1.5  Optimization and the expected path for the individual’s consumption 
Choosing optimal consumption is equivalent to choosing optimal real savings. The 
individuals thus act as if they were maximizing the utility in equation (2.3) with re-
spect to bond holdings. The latter is obtained by first solving the budget constraint 
in equation (2.4) for consumption and substituting this into the utility function. The 



















which is the standard Euler condition. The optimal time path of consumption de-
pends on the subjective discount rate, the interest rate and changes in the relative 
price of consumption. If  () 11 R β ≅+ , and if there is no change in relative prices, con-
sumption is constant over time. Note that the intertemporal allocation of consump-
tion is not distorted by the probability of death.
9 Yet the finiteness of lifespan affects 
the initial consumption level, as will be shown next. The Euler condition will be used 
below in the derivation of the consumption as a function of wealth.  
2.1.6  The individual’s consumption function 
Total wealth was defined above as the expected present value of any consumption 
path. Using the expression of total wealth in equation (2.6) and the Euler condition 
for the optimal consumption path in equation (2.12), the optimal level of consump-





tt t PC T W πβ =−  (2.13) 
Hence, the optimal consumption level in the current period is a fixed proportion of 
total wealth in the beginning of the period (the marginal propensity to consume out 
of wealth, MPC,  1 πβ =− ). More impatient individuals (i.e. lower β ) and/or higher 
probability of death (i.e. lower π ), yields higher consumption as of today. The spend-
ing propensity does not depend on age, which is a reflection of the assumption that 
the probability of death does not depend on age. As we shall see in the next section, 
this implies that the consumption function can be aggregated in a simple way. Fi-
nally, it is important to note that the interest rate is not an argument in the con-
                                     
9 According to Frenkel and Razin (1996), this property ensures the existence of a Pareto optimal equi-
librium (in the absence of other distortions of course).  
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sumption function. This is due to the use of logarithmic utility. A property does not 
hold for more general utility functions. 
2.1.7  Aggregation 
So far, we have considered an individual in generation i. That is, we have only shown 
expressions valid at this highly disaggregated level. There exist an infinite number of 
generations at each point of time. More specifically, the number of individuals in gen-
eration i in period t is denoted 
i
t LS  and the total number of individuals in the econ-








= ∑  (2.14) 
This definition and others shown below will be used when aggregating, in turn, bond 
wealth, stock wealth, human wealth, total wealth, the consumption function and, 
finally, the budget constraint. 





tt t t BWR P B −− − =+  (2.15) 
which is obtained by multiplying both sides of equation (2.9) with the number of in-
dividuals in generation i (
i
t LS ) and summarize over all generations, using the facts 
that 
 















for any stock variable  .
i
t X  As mentioned earlier, note the difference between the rate 
of return on bonds at the individual and the aggregated levels. In the former case, the 
effective rate of return was increased with the factor 1/π . At the aggregated level, 
the payments represent transfers within society and do not alter the social rate of 
return. 
Aggregating stock wealth given by equation (2.11) over all individuals yields 
  () 1,
D
tt tt SW V D τ =+−  (2.17) 
obtained by following the same steps as above and using the fact that the weights on 
the total stock (
i
t φ ) sum to one over the population.  
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Human wealth at the individual level is displayed in equation (2.8). Aggregating this 
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(2.18) 
where the total number of hours (including unemployed hours), human wealth, and 
transfer payment ( , ,  and  ) LH HW TR  satisfies the last equation in (2.16). 
In equations (2.18), the probability of death (π ) is included, in contrast to the ex-
pression for bonds and stocks in equations (2.15) and (2.17), respectively, above. The 
reason is that there is no way to transfer the human wealth of individuals who die. 
Hence, each generation (and therefore the society as a whole) takes the probability of 
death into account when considering the development of human wealth. 
Aggregate total wealth is the sum of the above aggregate wealth components, that is, 
  . ttt TW FW HW =+  (2.19) 
The aggregate consumption function is derived by aggregating the individuals’ con-
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where consumption and total wealth ( , and  ) CT W  satisfies the last equation in (2.16). 
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 (2.21) 
2.1.8  The aggregate expressions of total wealth and private consumption  
The Euler equation (i.e., the dynamics of consumption at the individual level) was 
derived in equation (2.12) above. There is no counterpart to that equation for the 
economy as a whole. Due to the introduction of finite live spans, one can not simply 
aggregate the individual’s utility maximization problem. The dynamics of aggregate 
consumption must instead be derived implicitly, through the aggregate consumption 
function, using the dynamics of aggregate total wealth, that is, 
  11 (1 ) (1 ) . tt t t TW R TW HW πβ π −− =+ +−  (2.22)  
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By substituting C  from the budget constraint for TW in equation (2.22), the dy-
namic behaviour of aggregate consumption is finally given by 
 
__
11 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) .
CP CP
tt t tt t PC R PC H W πβ πβ π −− − =+ +− −  (2.23) 
2.2  The labour market 
The purpose of this section is to derive the labour market equations used in 
KIMOD.
10 The labour market in KIMOD’s Steady state and Flex-price models builds 
heavily on Pissarides (2000). Wage setting is characterized by the “right-to-manage” 
assumption which implies that wages are negotiated before firms decide on invest-
ment and production. Firms with vacancies and unemployed workers are engaged in 
a costly search for a profitable match and unemployment is caused by matching inef-
ficiencies. As prices and wages are fully flexible, the outcome can be characterised as 
equilibrium unemployment. As we shall see in the derivation below, it depends on 
relative bargaining strengths, the job separation rate each period, the reservation 
wage, the cost of vacancies, the probability of survival, and the growth rate of the 
labour force.  
2.2.1  Employment dynamics 
The employment dynamics concern the stocks and flows out of and into employment 
and unemployment. The equations derived in this section are included in all three 
sub models of KIMOD.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the flows on the labour market between two periods. As was 
discussed in section 2.1.1 above, the working population is equal to the labour supply 
and grows at an exogenous rate, denoted ν .
11 The dynamics of the labour supply are 
thus simply given by  
  () 1 1. tt LS LS ν − =+  (2.24) 
                                     
10 Part of the derivation below follows Lindén (2004) closely (although the notation differs). 
11 It was shown that  (1 ) 1 a π ν =+ − , where π  is the probability of non-exit, and a  is the “birth-rate”, 
both of which are exogenous.  
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Figure 2.1  Flows in the labour market in KIMOD  
Note. LS: labour supply, L: no. of employed, U: no. of unemployed, π : survival rate, ν : 
growth rate of labour supply, MA: no. of matches, s: separation rate. 
Source: Lindén (2004). 
 
Furthermore, an individual is either employed or unemployed. It is sufficient to de-
termine unemployment in order to determine employment, due to the exogenous 
growth rate in equation (2.24). Formally, the following identity holds in all periods: 
  , ttt LS L U =+  (2.25) 
where  t L  is the number of employed individuals, and  t U  is the number of unem-
ployed. 
The number of unemployed people in period t is equal to the unemployed last period 
who did not exit ( 1 t U π − ), plus the flow of newcomers into the working population in 
the beginning of the period ( 11 (1 ) tt aL S L S πν π −− =+− ), plus the number of separations 
(firings) during the period ( t sL ,  01 s ≤≤), minus the number of successful matches 
(hirings) during the period ( t MA ), that is, 
  11 (1 ) , tt ttt UU L Ss L M A πν π −− =+ + − + −  (2.26) 
where we have used the fact that  1 aππ ν = + −  is the gross growth factor of the la-
bour supply. 
The process of matching vacancies and unemployed is viewed as an ordinary produc-
tion process. Matching is easier with more individuals unemployed or more vacancies 
to fill. Following the search-theoretical literature, we assume that the matching func-



















one percent, then the number of successful matches also increases with one percent. 
In KIMOD, the number of successful matches between firms vacancies ( t VA ) and un-
employment is determined by the following matching function which is increasing in 




tt t MA Z U VA
ηη − =  (2.27) 
where 
MA Z  is a positive constant (often denoted “matching efficiency”) and 
MA η  is 
the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment. Using equations (2.24), 
(2.25) and (2.27) above, equation (2.26) implies that the dynamics of the unemploy-

























where labour market tightness is defined as 
  /, tt t VA U ϑ =  (2.29) 
and the rate at which vacancies are filled is   
  () / . tt t JM A V A ϑ =  (2.30) 
Unemployment and vacancies are the only endogenous variables in equation (2.28) 
and we can calculate the vacancy rates ( / tt VA LS ) corresponding to different unem-
ployment rates ( / tt UL S ).  Combinations of unemployment and vacancy rates can be 
combined in the so-called Beveridge curve, (we return to this below). Note that the 
unemployment rate is constant in steady state. 
Solving (2.30) for the number of vacancies (VA) and using the expressions in (2.24), 
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ss
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++
 (2.32) 
Expression (2.32) is used below in section 2.3.3 were we discuss the behaviour of a 
representative firm. By opening vacancies, the firm can increase employment. The 
number actually in work at the end of the period depends also on the rate at which 
employees leave the firm (s), the rate at which employees formerly employed do sur-
vive (π ), and the efficiency of the matching process ( () t J ϑ ). 
2.2.2  Labour demand 
Labour demand in the Steady state and Flex-price models is determined by the rep-
resentative firm’s behaviour, discussed in section 2.3 below. This yields a first order 
condition involving the marginal productivity of labour and the labour cost, where 
both wages and hiring costs are taken into account. In the Flex-price model the mar-






























t W is the real hourly wage rate, 
P
t W γ  is the vacancy cost (cf. equation (2.44) 
below),  t R  is the real interest rate, and  t LH  is total working hours per year. In 
steady state, real wages grow at the rate 
GRF A  while the growth rate in hours and 
labour supply is zero. Hence, in the Steady state model the following expression is 
used: 
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 (2.34) 
The expression within the square brackets is greater than one, since 
/(1 ) 1
GRF
SS SS AR π +< . This implies that the marginal product of labour exceeds the real 
wage, as the firms have to bear the search cost due to unfilled vacancies. Equations 
(2.33) and (2.34) implicitly give labour demand, measured as vacancies, as a function 
of the real wage. 
2.2.3  Wage setting 
At the beginning of each period, local negotiations between a firm and a worker over 
the real wage are assumed to take place. Firms aim at low wages and they would like  
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to fill vacancies. Workers like high wages but dislike unemployment. The firm’s value 
function describes how firms value vacancies and filled jobs, and the worker’s value 
function describes how workers value unemployment and employment. The negotia-
tion ends up in a so-called Nash bargaining solution.
 12 This equilibrium wage rate is 
derived below. A number of factors together determine the bargain outcome: 
•  The relative bargaining strength of the worker, ( ,0 1 μμ << ), and of the firm 
(1 μ − ). The higher is μ , the higher the negotiated wage rate. 
•  Unemployment benefits (i.e. the worker’s reservation wage) are modelled as a 
share (01 ζ ≤≤ ) of the current real wage rate, 
P
t W ζ . The higher the reserva-
tion wage of the worker, the higher the negotiated wage rate. 
•  The workers’ marginal product,  t MPL , is the reservation wage of the firm.
13 
The higher the marginal product of labour, the higher the negotiated wage 
rate. 
•  The cost of a vacancy, relative to the wage rate, γ . The higher the cost of va-
cancies, the lower the negotiated wage rate. 
•  The greater the labour market tightness,  / tt VA U , the higher the negotiated 
wage rate. 
•  The greater the share of exogenous job separations in each period (due to e.g. 
a continuous structural change) the more costly is the search for successful 
matches that must be carried out, and, hence, the lower the negotiated wage 
rate. 
Before negotiation, a firm and a worker each have to value two different states (or 
outcomes). The firm has to calculate (i) the value of an unfilled vacancy (
V
t Λ ), the 
case in which the negotiations break down, and (ii) the value of a filled vacancy 
(
J
t Λ ). The worker has to calculate the value of (i) being unemployed (
U
t Λ ), the case 
in which the negotiations break down, and (ii) the value of being employed (
E
t Λ ). 
Now, the difference between the value of a filled job and a vacancy (
J V
tt Λ− Λ) must 
be greater than zero. This is also true for the difference between the value of being 
employed and unemployed (
E U
tt Λ− Λ). We assume “free entry” of vacancies, or, in 
                                     
12 See Nash (1950) and Binmore et al (1986).   
13 It is possible however that the wage rate temporarily exceeds the marginal product if the firm ex-
pects an increase in its labour demand in the near future. This is a type of labour hoarding behavior.  
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other words, to open a vacancy costs nothing. This implies that  0
V
t Λ=, that is, firms 
open vacancies until their value is zero. 
The Nash product that is to be maximized can now be formulated as follows: 
 
1 ,, max ( ) ( ) ,
i
t
iE i i U J i i V
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and the first order condition implies that 
 













where μ  is the relative bargaining strength of the worker; 
E
t τ  and 
W
t τ  are tax wedges 
associated with profits respectively wages. The above equation for period t and t+1 
can be used to substitute the value functions of the firm (
J V
tt Λ− Λ) for those of the 
worker (
E U
tt Λ− Λ). 
Eliminating the value functions in (2.36) yields an equation describing the equilib-
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 (2.37) 
Equation (2.37) is included in the flex-price part of KIMOD. The steady state version 













from which it is clear that the assumed bargaining strength of the workers () μ  is 
important for the determination of the equilibrium wage rate. A higher bargaining 
strength implies a higher wage. In steady-state, however, the wage cannot exceed the 
firm’s reservation wage ( ss MPL ) This implies that the parameters of KIMOD have to 












In the normal case this inequality is strict, so that the negotiation puts a wedge be-
tween the real wage and the marginal productivity, compared to the case of perfect 
competition.   
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2.2.4  Determination of labour market tightness, unemployment and vacancies in 
equilibrium 
To sum up, the labour demand curve in equation (2.34) is only determined by the 
firms’ optimization behaviour, taking the real wage as given. The wage setting curve 
in equation (2.38) is determined by negotiations between both workers and firms; the 
workers thus indirectly also control the labour demand. When the two curves inter-
sect, the labour market is in equilibrium. Figure 2.2 illustrates the result.  
Formally, eliminating 

















++ − = −−− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
 (2.40) 
Labour market tightness () t ϑ  is the only endogenous variable in the above equation 
and can therefore be determined. This equilibrium value can then be inserted in ei-
ther the labour demand or the wage setting equation to calculate the equilibrium 
value of the real wage to marginal productivity ratio,  /
P WM P L . 
Figure 2.2  Labour market equilibrium 
 
Note. W
P: real wage in private sector, MPL: marginal productivity of labour, VA: no. of va-
cancies, U: no. of unemployed.  








Labour demand  
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Equilibrium unemployment and vacancies is then given by the dynamics of the la-
bour market. By definition,  / tt t VA U ϑ = , which is a straight line from the origin in 
the vacancies-unemployment space, see figure 2.3, where the slope is equal to the la-
bour market tightness. The equilibrium unemployment rate is given by the intersec-
tion of this line and the Beveridge curve (see equation (2.28), under equilibrium la-
bour market tightness. Finally, the equilibrium number of vacancies can be calculated 
using the definition of labour market tightness.  
 
Figure 2.3  The Beveridge curve and equilibrium labour market tightness 
Note. VA: no. of vacancies, U: no. of unemployed, LS: labour supply. 
Source: Lindén (2004). 
2.3  Private production 
In KIMOD, the production of private goods for final consumption takes place in a 
two step procedure. The first step uses resources and generates added value in the 
form of intermediaries while the second step simply combines domestic and imported 
intermediate goods into final goods. The first three sections below present the theory 
behind the intermediate production. In section 2.3.4, the production of final goods is 
discussed. 
2.3.1  Preliminaries 
An infinite number of identical competitive firms use a constant return to scale tech-
nology (Cobb-Douglas) to produce an intermediate good. In this process, resources 
  VA/LS 
(VA/LS)* 
Beveridge curve 
U/LS  (U/LS)*  
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are used in the form of labour and capital services.  Resources are also used for instal-
lation of capital and for hiring labour. The basics of a representative firm are given 
























  () 1 1
IP I P IP
tt t t tt PK PI PK δ − =+ −  (2.42) 
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The production function in equation (2.41) describes the private gross production 
(
PG Y ), where 
YPG η  is the output elasticity of capital (equal to the capital share in 
equilibrium),  t AH  denotes labour-augmenting (i.e., Harrod-neutral) productivity, and 
P
t LH  is hours worked in the private sector; thus 
H P
tt A LH ⋅  is the amount of efficient 
labour. Harrod-neutrality implies the property that the factor proportions only 
change if relative factor prices change. The capital accumulation equation (2.42) im-
plicitly assumes that the depreciation rate (δ ) captures physical depreciation only, 
not the effect of a change in asset prices (
I
t P ). Furthermore, equation (2.43) shows 
that a standard assumption of a quadratic installation cost is made, with parameter 
λ ,  0 λ > . According to equation (2.44), the unit cost for vacancies during a period is 
assumed to be proportional to the annual wage of an employed person 
( ()
P P
tt t NW LH L , where 
P P
tt LH L  is the average working hours in the private sector) 
with the (constant) factor γ ,  0 γ > , indicating the proportion. The number of vacan-
cies in the private sector is a fraction ( /
P
tt LL ) of the total number of vacancies ( t VA ).   
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The value added of the firm (denoted 
P
t Y ) is equal to the value of the gross produc-
tion, less the installation cost of capital and the cost of hiring labour, that is, 
14 
  () .
YP P YPG PG I P P P
tt t t t t t t t PB Y PB Y P IC I PVC =− − −  (2.45) 
The net cash flow from the firm to the household is defined as the amount available 
for dividends in the current period. Corporate incomes are not taxed at the corporate 
level, but the dividends are taxed at the household level. Net operating surplus (OS ) 
is defined as the value added less the cost of wages and consumption of fixed capital, 
that is,  
  1,
YP P P I P
tt t t t t t t POS PB Y NWLH P K δ − =− − (2.46) 
where  NW  is the nominal wage in the private sector, including employers’ social se-
curity contributions.
15 
Dividends ( tt PD) are finally given by the value added less the cost of wages and in-




YP P P I P
tt t t t t tt
IP P
tt tt t
PD PB Y NWLH P I




2.3.2  Investors’ perspective 
It is assumed that firms act on behalf of their owners and maximize their profits. The 
household can choose between consumption and investing in bonds or shares. The 
planning horizon differs between households and firms. For an individual household 
there exist two financial assets, one nominal bond with prices determined on a world 
market and one entitlement to future dividends from the firms.  
Solving the household’s optimization problem yields an expression for the real value 
of the firm’s equity, that is, the real value of the total number of shares:  









τ ++ + =+ −
+
 (2.48) 
                                     
14  PB  refers to “basic prices” according to the National accounts, that is, factor prices plus other 
taxes (net of subsidies) on production not included “taxes on products” (e.g. VAT), or, equivalently, 
market prices less taxes on products (VAT). 
15 The real rate of return on capital can be measured as 
1.
IP
ttt t POS P K
−   
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=− ∑  (2.49) 
where the discount factor is  () 1 1/ 1 tj tj tj R γγ ++ + − =+ ,  1 t γ = , and where we have as-
sumed that V  and D are bounded from above and that the “No-Ponzi-game condi-
tion” is fulfilled. Note that the value of the firm is independent of the generation in-
dex. One interpretation of equation (2.49) is that the equilibrium (arbitrage free) val-
ue of the outstanding shares depends on the expected present value of pre-tax divi-
dends, discounted with the opportunity cost given by the return on bonds. At the 
same time, this is the value which the household wants the firms to maximize. 
2.3.3  Behaviour of the representative firm 
The firm will choose production, hiring and investment as if it would maximize the 
value of the firm for its owners. Using the expression for  t V  in equation (2.49), this 
implies that the firm solves 
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⎣ ⎦ ∑  (2.50) 
subject to the “budget constraint” in equation (2.47), the dynamics of the vacancies 
in equation (2.31), and appropriate boundary and non-negativity conditions.  
Furthermore, wage negotiations as described in section 2.2 are assumed to take place 
and determine real wages in advance of the firm’s other decisions, including the num-
ber of vacancies to open. Therefore the firm will take real wages as given. 

















i.e. the value of a marginal unit of capital is equal to the marginal cost for investment 
and the increase in installation costs. If q is greater than the total marginal cost, it 
will be profitable to invest further. Due to the homogenous specification of installa-
tion costs in equation (2.43), marginal q and average q coincide. 
The first order condition for choosing an optimal path for capital is  
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+ = . 
The interpretation of this is that the shadow price today is equal to the present value 
of the next period’s increase in marginal productivity and the decrease in costs for 
installation, as well as the next period’s value for q. 
An interpretation of q can be suggested by forward substitution of (2.52), slightly 
simplified by assuming constant rates of taxation, giving 
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⎢ ⎥ =− + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
∑  (2.53) 
that is, the shadow price of installed capital is equal to the discounted future incomes 
from the marginal product of that investment and the reduction of installation costs 
due to the expansion of the capital stock. 
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⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +
=+ − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (2.54) 
The second term on the right hand side shows that profits are increasing in future 
increases in π , due to savings in costs for vacancies when more of the employed to-
day survive until tomorrow, and because of the resulting reduction in future efficiency 
of matching  () 1 t J ϑ + . 
2.3.4  Final good production and relative prices  
There are three types of final privately produced goods in the economy: a consump-
tion good, an investment good, and an export good. Competitive firms produce these 
goods using a constant return to scale technology. They use both the domestically 
produced intermediate good (discussed above), and an imported good as factors of 
production. Thus, these firms essentially combine the intermediate good and the im-
ported good, there is no value added created in this production and no profits either, 
as the firms just cover their costs. The producers of the intermediate good are not 
able to price discriminate between the final goods producers. The price of the input 
to each final good is thus the same, and is therefore equal to the price of total private  
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production. It follows that the value added of private production (
P
t Y ) must satisfy 
the following identity: 
  ,
P HH H H
ttt tt YCGIX =++ +  (2.55) 
where superscript H  denotes home produced goods, used as input to the private con-
sumption good, the government consumption good (discussed in section 2.4), the in-
vestment good, and the export good, respectively. Total imports must also satisfy a 
similar adding up constraint, 
  ,
FF F
ttt t M CIX =+ +  (2.56) 
where superscript F  denotes imported foreign input. It is assumed that the produc-
tion of the government consumption good does not use any imported input and that 
the import price is the same regardless final use.  
Consider the production of the consumption good. The market value (at basic prices) 
of private consumption is denoted 
C
tt PB C  and the cost of producing it consists of the 
cost for the home produced input and the imported foreign produced good. Hence, 
the competitive firms seek to maximize profits, defined as 
  ,
CY P H M F
ct tt t t t PB C PB C P C ∏= − −  (2.57) 
subject to the technology constraint 





tc t t CA C C
ηη −
=  (2.58) 




































which together with similar expressions for the other good and the identities in equa-
tion (2.55) and (2.56), are used to determine total private production and imports. 
The first order conditions also determine the relative price of consumption, and in a 
similar way, the relative price of investment and exports, 
 














− −− ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞⎛⎞ ⎢⎥ =+ ⎜⎟⎜⎟ −− ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 (2.61)  
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Due to competition, firms make zero profits in equilibrium, which gives marginal cost 
pricing according to equation (2.61). Marginal costs, that is the right hand side of 
(2.61), depend on domestic and import prices, all measured in national currency, pro-
ductivity as well as the demand elasticity. 
2.4  The government 
The formulation of government behaviour in KIMOD is much simpler than that of 
the household and firm outlined in the previous sections. There are several reasons 
for this. First, there is only one agent, the general government. That is, we do not 
have to aggregate expressions over individuals or generations as we did for the house-
holds. Second, whereas individuals and firms solve explicit maximization problems, 
the majority of the choices of the government are simply imposed in the steady state 
and flex-price parts of KIMOD. Debt and spending targets are such examples. Other 
variables (e.g., the labour income tax rate and the budget balance), although endoge-
nous, are restricted in such a way that appropriate long run targets are met. 
The government affects the behaviour of individuals and firms in several ways. For 
example, due to the assumption of finite lives, Ricardian equivalence does not hold in 
the model. Hence, the timing of taxes affects the perceived wealth of the individuals, 
which in turn affects their consumption and saving decisions. Note, however, that the 
labour income tax does not affect labour supply since the latter is exogenous in the 
current version of the model.
16 The government influences firms through the aggre-
gate demand channel and thereby expected returns. Moreover, profitability is affected 
by the tax rate on dividends. 
In sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, we describe government production and consumption, re-
spectively. In section 2.4.3 we present the public sector’s budget constraint. In order 
to exclude explosive paths of government debt, the model is written in a way that 
ensures that imposed debt targets are met in steady state. These dynamic processes 
are discussed in section 2.4.4. 
2.4.1  Government production 
The government consumes all of the goods and services it produces. The production 
function is simple and corresponds to the National Accounts measure of production in 
                                     
16 The individuals behave as if the labour income tax were a lump sum tax.  
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the public sector. Both labour and capital are used in production and the value added 
from government production is defined as 
  1,
YG G P G I G
tt t t t t PB Y NW LH P K αδ − =+  (2.62) 
where 
G
t Y  is the government real value added, or real production, 
YG
t PB  is the gov-
ernment production deflator at basic prices, 
P
t NW α  is the nominal hourly wage rate 
in the public sector, assumed to be proportional to the wage in the private sector, 
G
t LH  is total hours worked in the government sector, δ  is the depreciation rate of 
capital, and 
G
t K  is the government capital stock.  
2.4.2  Government consumption 
Government consumption refers to the traditional part included in the GDP identity. 
The major component of government consumption is government production. The 
second, and final, component is the amount of the home produced consumption good 
purchased by the government, 
H
t G .
17 The nominal consumption identity for the gov-
ernment is  
  ,
GY P H Y G G
tt t t tt PB G PB G PB Y =+ (2.63) 
where 
G
t PB  is the government consumption deflator, 
YP
t PB  is the deflator of produc-
tion of consumption goods, all in basic prices. 
2.4.3  Budget constraint  
Government consumption is an important part of the expenditure side of the public 
sector’s budget constraint. The public budget balance is given by:  
  11 1
.
PG
WP Y P G ttt
tt tt t t
ttt
CC GG D G M G
tt t tt t t t t t t t t t
GI G P Y P G
tt t t t t t tt
LH LH UH
PBB W PB LH
LH LH LH
PB C PB G PD PK NR P B





⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=+ + ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
++ + + +
−−− −
 (2.64) 
The first four terms in the equation are tax revenues from, respectively, labour in-
come, private consumption, government consumption, and dividends. The next terms 
are gross value added of government production
18 and net interest payments. On the 
                                     
17 It is straightforward to allow government consumption to include imported consumption goods as 
well. 
18 Gross operating surplus equals the value of production minus wage costs.  
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expenditure side we have government consumption, government investments, unem-
ployment benefits, and other net transfer payments. Note that the tax base for taxes 
on labour income includes income of the unemployed.  
2.4.4  Dynamic expressions for the public sector 
Although most of the government variables are just imposed exogenously, there are 
some exceptions. The evolution of debt is naturally a variable that is endogenous and 
depends on the dynamics of the budget balance (which includes the interest rate on 
net bond holdings) and changes in the relative price of imports (
_ M PM P PP P ≡ ). 
More specifically, the dynamics of real government bond holdings are defined as: 
 
__ _ _
11 1 () .
M PG M PG M P M P G
tt t tt t t t PBB B PB P P B −− − =+ + −  (2.65) 
Note that there is no interest term in this expression as it was accounted for in the 
expression for the budget balance above. 
In order not to allow the government to choose explosive paths of its net bond hold-
ings (or, equally, net debt), at least one policy variable must be determined endoge-
nously so that a preset target for net bond holdings is fulfilled in steady state. That 
is, although net bond holdings can temporarily be off target in the flex-price part of 
KIMOD, they are forced to go in the direction determined by the exogenously given 
steady state target. In the present version of KIMOD, we use the labour income tax 
rate to be the policy variable that ensures that the net bond holdings target is ful-
filled in the long run. More specifically, we let the labour income tax rate in the flex-
price part of KIMOD be a function of both the steady state labour income tax rate 
(
W
ss τ ) and the steady state target for net bond holdings (
_ MP G
sss s s s PB Y ), that is, 
 
__
1 (1 ) .
MP G MP G





τχ τ χ τχ −
⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞
=+ − − − ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
 (2.66) 
Equation (2.66) is of course only one of many possible formulations. Note, finally, 
that any other policy variable can be used in order achieve the steady state net bond 
holding target.  
2.5  The external sector 
KIMOD is designed for analyses of the Swedish economy. The model thus satisfies 
the standard properties of a domestic small open economy. The interaction with the 
rest of the world, i.e. the external sector, is discussed in this section.  
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2.5.1  Net foreign assets, net exports, and the current account 
Some of the parameters in the model are crucial for the determination of the dynamic 
paths and the steady state values of net foreign assets, net exports and the current 
account. Important examples of these so-called ‘deep parameters’ are the real interest 
rate (R ) and the subjective discount rate (β ). 
The dynamics of the net foreign asset position are determined by the development of 
net exports. If net exports are positive, domestic claims on the rest of the world in-
crease or, equivalently, net foreign assets increase. Since government bonds are traded 
on an international market, net foreign assets are equal to the annual change in the 
sum of private and government bonds (
P G B B + ). The formal relationship between 
net exports ()
NET




11 1 _ () ( 1 ) ( ) .
MP
NET P G P G t
tt t t t t MP
t
P
XB B R B B
P
−
−− − =+− + +  (2.67) 
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ss A  is the growth factor of productivity, and ν  is the growth rate of labour 
supply. Note that if consumers become, say, more patient and savings increase, then 
private bond holdings (
P B ) rise and so do net foreign assets. This gathering of assets 
will allow for higher net exports in steady state according to (2.68). 
Finally, the current account balance (CA) is simply defined as the sum of net exports 




MP N E T MP P G
tt t t t s ss s CA P X R P B B −− =+ +  (2.69) 
2.5.2  Real exchange rate 
What regards the determination of the real exchange rate, the law of one price are 
not assumed to hold in KIMOD, not even in the long run. That is, the model is not 
required to respect the Absolute Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However, we do 
require (some) respect for the relative version of PPP. This hypothesis says that the 
domestic inflation, for a specific consumption basket, should in the long run be equal 
to the expected foreign inflation, measured in a common currency. This would imply 
that the expected real exchange rate should be constant over time in equilibrium.   
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Furthermore, the assumption in KIMOD of a common international bond market 
implies that the real interest rates are the same for all agents in the model world. 
This, in turn, implies that the expected rate of future depreciation or appreciation is 
zero, to satisfy the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). This is another reason why 
long-lasting trends of the real exchange rate are not allowed in the Flex-price model. 
Only unanticipated shocks could change the real exchange. Strictly speaking, in be-
tween two steady states, real exchange rate jump instantaneously to a new equilib-
rium, such that UIP holds.  
In practice, the model must also be able to explain the persistence behaviour of the 
real exchange rate in data, besides the theoretical parities. Therefore, we relax the 
theoretical results in the Sticky-price model by allowing smooth adjustments over a 
few years to a new steady state, instead of a discrete jump (see chapter 3). The 
model used in the equilibrium part of KIMOD for determining the real exchange rate 
is based on, and described in, Nilsson (2002). Two equations included in the Steady-

























=  (2.71) 
The real exchange rate () t RER  is explained by relative TFP-levels (
H F
tt AA ), terms 
of trade (
XM
tt PP ) and net foreign asset to GDP ratio (()
PG
tt t B BY + ). Furthermore, 
the relative price of imports ()
M
tt PP  are (almost by definition) equal to the relative 
import price denominated in foreign currency, multiplied with the real exchange rate.  
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3  Business cycle theory: the Sticky-price model 
The third and final part of KIMOD is the Sticky-price model. Here, imperfect infor-
mation and bounded rationality are present, yielding nominal as well as real rigidi-
ties. Imperfect information and bounded rationality make consumers, investors as 
well as price and wage setters partially backward looking, which in turn implies that 
adjustments to a new equilibrium are time consuming. These rigidities imply a role 
for stabilization policies, such as monetary and fiscal policies, with the aim of moving 
the economy in the direction of the flex-price equilibrium. In short, the Sticky-price 
model aims at describing the properties of the Swedish economy at business cycle 
frequencies, say 1–6 years.  
By construction, the Sticky-price model takes equilibrium developments as exogenous 
and all deviations from equilibrium are of transitory nature. In particular, nominal 
shocks have no lasting real effects and cannot change relative prices permanently. 
This means that stabilization policy, in the form of monetary and fiscal interventions, 
has no impact on equilibrium levels of real variables such as GDP and unemploy-
ment. 
Since economic theory is more eclectic in its explanations of business cycle move-
ments, we need to sacrifice some theoretical stringency in order to be able to describe 
the Swedish economy at business cycle frequency. Hence, in the Sticky-price model, 
we introduce structure and variables in a somewhat ad hoc manner, as compared to 
the theoretically based Steady state and Flex-price models. 
This chapter describes how volumes, prices, expectations, monetary policy and fiscal 
policy are modelled in the Sticky-price model. 
3.1  General structures for volumes and prices 
The Sticky-price model is designed to deliver both policy advice and support to the 
forecasting process at the NIER. A macroeconomic model like KIMOD needs to be 
tractable in order to be able to tell a reliable economic “story” around policy issues 
including forecasts. Telling reliable stories is an important part of the presentation of 
results from KIMOD. Compared to more traditional forecasting processes, a model 
like KIMOD provides a consistent structure to the discussion. The model ensures 
that all the main economic restrictions, consistency requirements and relationships 
are included in the analysis. As a consequence, the Sticky-price model is not built to  
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minimize forecast errors. Saying this does not imply that statistical fit is not an issue 
but, rather, that statistical fit is not the only (or the most important) issue. 
To formulate a tractable short run model, we need to model volume and price re-
sponses separately. The motion equations for most real variables therefore lack an 
explicit dependence on associated prices.
19 This is not that far fetched in a staggered 
price setting where volumes in the short run are demand driven anyway. The follow-
ing sections will discuss the general principles behind volume and price behaviour. 
3.2  Volume equations 
In this section, we first discuss the general structure of the volume equations (section 
3.2.1). Then we turn to the principles of estimating volume relations (section 3.2.2). 
Finally, we discuss some important volume equations in the Sticky-price model (sec-
tions 3.2.3-3.2.11).  
3.2.1  The basics for volume equations  
As discussed in chapter 1, the three models of KIMOD – Steady state, Flex-price and 
Sticky-price – are valid at different frequencies (long run, medium run and short 
run). Still, a variable included in all of the three models could be determined by simi-
lar processes across the models. Private consumption, for example, is driven by total 
wealth in both the Steady state and Flex-price models. Total wealth, however, is 
somewhat sticky in the Flex-price model due to real rigidities. As a result, the private 
consumption paths of the Steady state and Flex-price models generally coincide only 
in the long run. In the Sticky-price model, private consumption is still driven by total 
wealth through the latter’s dependence on the flex-price value of private consump-
tion. But, as we add imperfect information and imperfectly rational behaviour to the 
Sticky-price model, private consumption now becomes also driven by other processes 
such as uncertainty and habits.  
The generic form of the dynamic equations for volumes in the Sticky-price model is 
derived here. The derivation illustrates the close connection to the Flex-price model 
                                     
19 If prices and volumes were to be determined simultaneously, the model would become untractable. 
Prices do, however, affect volumes indirectly through their effects on monetary policy and thus interest 
rates and exchange rates.  
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discussed above. If we let variable  X  be driven by the same process in both the 
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where the variables  t X  and  t Y  are endogenous,  t Z  is exogenous
20, the coefficients (as-
sumed here to be the same in the two models) are constants and  1 11 a −< <. In order 
to derive the generic form of the volume equations in the Sticky-price model, we first 
perform a purely algebraic operation and set the two equations in (3.1) equal to each 
other:
21 
  11 2 3 11 2 3 .
SP SP SP SP FP FP FP FP
tt tt tt tt X a Xa Ya ZXa Xa Ya Z −− −−−= −−− (3.2) 
If we then add () 11
FP SP
tt XX −− − to both sides and rearrange, we get: 
  () () () ( ) ( ) 1 1 111 2 3 1,
SP SP FP FP SP FP SP FP SP FP
tt tt t t t t t t XX XX a XX a Y Y a Z Z −− − − =+ − − − − + −+ −  (3.3) 
which is the generic form for the dynamics of volumes in the Sticky-price-model. In 
short, we make use of the fact that variable  X  is driven by the same processes in the 
two models and model the development of 
SP X  as deviations from the Flex-price 
model.
22 More specifically, the interpretation of the first two expressions on the right-
hand-side of equation (3.3) is that the annual change in the variable is basically equal 
to the annual change in the equilibrium counterpart. The third expression is an error-
correction term, increasing the annual change if the variable was below equilibrium 
last period, i.e. if the “gap” were negative.
23 The fourth expression implies that it is 
the gap, not the level, of other endogenous variables that influences the result. Fi-
nally, the fifth expression concerns the effect on 
SP X  stemming from the deviation of 
the exogenous variable Z  from its flex-price value.  
                                     
20 As we will discuss later on (see section 3.2.2), we try to avoid the inclusion of exogenous variables. 
Of course, there are cases in which exogenous variables have to play an important role. For example, 
foreign productivity growth is exogenous and included in the equation determining Swedish productiv-
ity growth. 
21 This is valid as both the left and right hand sides of equation (3.2) are equal to  0 a  due to equation 
(3.1). 
22 Note that equation (3.3) is just a generic example. In practice, due to the inclusion of imperfect 
information and non-rationality, a variable like 
SP X  may be driven by variables not included in the 
Flex-price model. 
23 Assuming  1 01 a << .  
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Equation (3.3) also implies that the Sticky-price variable converges to the flex-price 
variable if 
SP Y  and 
SP Z  converge to the flex-price counterparts. Hence, one has to 
include a structure (e.g. using error-correction terms) that is compatible with this 
requirement.  
3.2.2  Choice of volume equations 
In order to be able to project the model into the future, we have to take into account 
historical economic relationships. These historical relationships may have more or less 
of a theoretical foundation. As stressed above, however, we do not aim at minimizing 
forecasting errors at the cost of not being able to tell economically reliable stories.  
We try to only include endogenous variables when possible in the various volume 
specifications, that is, variables which are determined elsewhere in the Sticky-price 
model. Again the reason is the importance of being able to support the result with a 
reliable story. By definition, an exogenous variable is determined (and predicted) out-
side the model and can therefore not contribute to an explanation of the overall 
model response.
24 
In short, the following criteria have been guiding the choice of volume equations: 
•  The specification must ensure that the sticky-price variable in question con-
verges to the flex-price counterpart within reasonable time. This is generally 
ensured by the inclusion of error-correction terms. 
•  The variables included must be determined elsewhere in the model, i.e. they 
must be endogenous.  
•  We use variables suggested by economic theory whenever possible. 
•  We aim at good fit. 
•  We eliminate serial correlation and endogeneity problems by using lags and in-
strumental variable in the estimation phase. 
In the following sections, we present the general structure of some important volume 
equations. The exact specifications are not reported as they are in the process of revi-
sion. 
                                     
24 Of course, there are cases in which exogenous variables should be included. One such case is the 
labour supply, which currently is exogenous in KIMOD. This variable is important for determining the 
unemployment rate (and thereby short run nominal wage growth etc.) in the Sticky-price model.  
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3.2.3  Private consumption expenditure 
The consumption function is in the spirit of Muellbauer and Lattimore (1994) who 
incorporate stochastic expectations, precautionary behaviour, credit constraints, habit 
information, alternatives to rational expectations as well as assets in their consump-
tion function. Although all of their theoretically justified variables have not been in-
cluded in KIMOD 1.0, some of them (such as assets) may be included in the future. 
The following variables are included: 
() 11 1 1 1 ln ln , ln , ln , _ , ,ln ln ,
FP FP
tt t t t t t t Cf C C Y D U L SR C C −− − − − Δ= Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ −           (3.4) 
where superscript “FP” refers to equilibrium values from the Flex-price model, YD is 
disposable income,  _ UL S  is the unemployment rate, R  is the real interest rate and 
11 ln ln
FP
tt CC −− −  is an error-correction term. In general, unemployment represents (oth-
erwise unmodelled) uncertainty whereas lagged consumption growth and lagged dis-
posable income account for habits and credit constrained individuals, respectively. 
3.2.4  Gross capital formation in the business sector (investments) 
In the Steady state and Flex-price models, investments are determined by Tobin’s q. 
This theory, although probably valid in the long run, has difficulties explaining short 
run movements in investment flows.  
According to the research literature, current and historical cash flows
25 can be impor-
tant variables in determining short run investment flows (see Gilchrist and Himmel-
berg, 1998, and Hubbard, 1998). That is, firms seem to prefer to use their own cash 
instead of new loans or new issues of stocks. In the estimated investment function, 
change in cash flow is approximated by production growth (
P Y Δ ). The following 
variables are included in the investment equation of the private sector (
P I ): 
  ()
,, , ,
1 111 1 1 1 1 ln ln , ln , ln , , ,ln ln ,ln ln ,
P P FP P FP P FP P P FP P P FP
t t t ttt t t t t If I Y Y R R I I K K −− − − − − − − Δ= Δ Δ Δ − − (3.5) 
where 
P K  is the capital stock in the private sector. One can note that two error-
correction terms are needed here, with respect to both investments and the capital 
stock, in order to ensure that both investment and capital stock levels converge to 
their equilibrium counterparts.  
                                     
25 The cash flow is generally defined as the value of sales minus cost of production. In KIMOD the 
latter corresponds to the cost of investments and labour (including installation costs of capital and 
vacancy costs).  
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Total investment (I ) in equation (3.5) is the sum of private investment (
P I ) and 
government investment (
G I ). The latter is exogenous in KIMOD 1.0 and determined 
by the government sector experts at the NIER.  
3.2.5  Exports 
As can be seen from the consumption function, equation (3.4), and the investment 
function, equation (3.5), the real interest rate (R ) enters only with a lag. Exports, on 
the other hand, depend on the real exchange rate (which, in turn, is determined by 
the real interest rate, see section 3.5) in the current period, according to equation 
(3.6) below:  
  () 11 1 1 ln ln , ln , ln , , ,ln ln .
FP FP FP FP
tt t t t t t t X f X X X RER RER X X −− − − Δ= Δ Δ Δ −  (3.6) 
Monetary policy, which affects the real exchange rate without any (yearly) lag 
through the nominal interest rate, thus exerts a direct channel into aggregate de-
mand.  
3.2.6  Imports 
Imported goods (superscript “F”) are simply a function of consumption, investment, 
and export demand. The weights are identical to those of the Flex-price model and 




FF P FF P FF P
tt t





⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
=+ + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (3.7) 
3.2.7  Gross domestic product (GDP) 
GDP at fixed market prices is then simply the sum of private consumption (3.4), 
government consumption (G , exogenous, see section 3.8), private investments (3.5), 
government investments (
G I ), exports (3.6) minus imports (3.7). 
3.2.8  Average working hours 
To describe the modelling of the labour market in the Sticky-price model, we first 
consider the empirical specification of business cycle movements in average working 
hours. There is a fairly clear business cycle pattern for average working hours in the 
Swedish economy. Average working hours increase in (especially in the beginning of) 
upturns and falls in downturns, according to a clear pro-cyclical pattern. The specifi-
















⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞




t D =  in upturns, i.e. when actual GDP growth is higher than potential 
growth. It turns out that if average working hours are initially in equilibrium (i.e., 
the error-correction term is zero), an upturn implies that average working hours grow 
by about 0,3 percentage points per year. In downturns, average working hours fall by 
about 0,4 percentage points per year.  
3.2.9  Employment and unemployment 
As described in chapter 2, the full labour market model by Pissarides (2000) is ap-
plied in the Steady state and Flex-price models. Since the Pissarides model deals with 
equilibrium unemployment only, it needs to be adjusted in order to deal with business 
cycle variations in unemployment.  
Instead of letting (the entirely forward looking) equilibrium labour demand determine 
labour demand in the Sticky-price model, we model labour demand as a weighted 
average of backward (superscript “BACK”) and forward looking (superscript “FOR”) 
labour demand (in hours), 
P
t LH : 
 
1, 1 , ln ln (1 )ln ,
P LH P BACK LH P FOR
tt t LH LH LH ηη =+ − (3.9) 




11 ln ln (ln ln ).
P BACK P BACK P FP P FP
tt t t LH LH LH LH −− =+ −  (3.10) 
For the forward looking part, we first invert the production function so that working 
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=− − − ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 (3.11) 
Since it is costly to hire and fire labour, the firms determine their labour demand by 
forming expectations about future production (i.e. demand), taking future productiv-
ity and capital stock into account. Currently in KIMOD, firms form expectations (su-
perscript “E”) for period t, t+1, and t+2 when determining labour demand in period 














ln ln 1 ln ln
1
1
ln 1 ln ln
1
1





P FOR LH PG YPG H YPG P
tt t t YPG
LH PG YPG H YPG P
tt t YPG
LH LH PG YPG H YPG P
tt t YPG













=− − − + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞
−− − + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞
−− − − − ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
(3.12) 
where  ()
23 2 3 ,, 1
LH LH LH LH ηη η η −−  are the weights on the different horizons. Expecta-
tion formation is discussed in section 3.4. 
The hours demanded in the government sector (
G LH ) are proportional to govern-
ment production. At present, this variable is exogenous in KIMOD 1.0 and is deter-
mined by the government sector experts at the NIER.  
As we now have labour demand in hours and average working hours from equations 














=  (3.13) 
where the denominator is average working hours determined in equation (3.8). The 







=  (3.14) 
3.2.10  Number of matches and vacancies 
In order to calculate the number of matches and vacancies, we assume that both the 
labour market flow equation and the matching function are valid in the Sticky-price 
model as well. The former was: 
  () 11 1, tt t ttt UU L Ss L M A πν π −− =+ + − + −  (3.15) 
where  t ν  is labour supply growth rate, () 1 1 tt LS νπ − +−  is the number of newcomers 
to the labour force who become initially unemployed, s is the exogenous share of 
separations of the current labour force due to ongoing structural change and  t MA  is 
the number of successful matches. See Figure 2.1 in chapter 2 for a visual description 
of the labour market flows in equation (3.15).   
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As we already have information on the unemployment rate  t U , thanks to equation 
(3.14), and on employment  t L , due to equation (3.13), we can calculate the number 
of successful matches  t MA  in equation (3.15). Finally, we get the number of vacan-




tt t MA Z U VA
ηη − =  (3.16) 
In summary, the Pissarides (2000) labour market model is used to calculate the num-
ber of matches and vacancies in the Sticky-price model.  
3.2.11  Production, dividends, and disposable income 
The production function of the business sector is assumed to hold in the Sticky-price 
model as well, see equation (3.11). The inputs, capital stock and hours, of course 
come from the Sticky-price model. The investment equation (3.5) builds the capital 
stock. Labour demand for hours is given by equation (3.11).  
Government production is currently captured by a simple error-correction equation so 
that the sticky-price value converges to the flex-price value in the case in which they 
are not the same initially. As mentioned above, government production is exogenous 
in the Sticky-price model and borrowed from the government sector experts at the 
NIER. 
Dividends are calculated in the same way as in the Flex-price model. The arguments, 
production, investment costs, and labour costs, are taken from the Sticky-price 
model, with two exceptions. The installation cost of investment and the vacancy 
costs are currently equal to the values of the Flex-price model. The reason is that 
dividends get very volatile if they include the Sticky-price counterparts. This calls for 
further analysis. 
Finally, disposable income is defined as in the Flex-price model while of course the 
values of the variables included come from the Sticky-price model. 
3.3  Nominal prices and wages 
This section describes the price and wage setting behaviour in the Sticky-price model. 
In the New Keynesian literature, there are many explanations and formulations of 
why prices and wages are sticky. All of these can of course not be included in the 
Sticky-price model. However, as will be outlined below, the spirit of some of them is  
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taken into account when specifying the price and wage equations. We begin with 
price setting. 
3.3.1  The generic pricing problem  
On this occasion, we need to be a bit agnostic. We introduce a hypothesis about price 
setting firms in the short run without supporting this by assuming monopolistic com-
petition in the equilibrium part of the model. This is not fully satisfying and should 
be an entry for future development. 
In the short run, firms are assumed to be price setters. As mentioned above, there are 
many explanations of why prices are sticky in the short run. The pricing equations in 
KIMOD are in the spirit of Calvo (1983) and the menu cost literature (see Mankiw, 
1985). In Calvo (1983), it is assumed that only a fraction of all firms get the oppor-
tunity to reset prices every period. Knowing that it will take a while before it gets 
the opportunity again, the firm will behave in a forward looking manner. It will plan 
for the foreseeable future and set prices in accordance to perceived future costs and 
mark-ups.  
It is important to note, though, that Calvo (1983) does not offer any explanation of 
why firms can not change their prices every period. The menu-cost literature focuses 
on the actual costs of changing prices as an explanation. These and other related 
theories of the root cause of price stickiness provide possible explanations of why in-
flation is often found to be both autocorrelated and forward looking in data. Krieger 
and Tinsley (2001) model this observed behaviour by assuming that firm i minimizes 
the following quadratic loss function when setting its’ price 
, iY P G PB : 






argmin ln ln ( )ln ,
22 iY P G
t
s iY P G iY P G
tt s t s t s
PB s




⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ −+ ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭ ∑  (3.17) 
where  b  is a discount factor, 
* PB  is the equilibrium price level and  () cL is a lag 
polynomial that represents price frictions. Equation (3.17) implies that it is costly for 
firms both to deviate from the equilibrium price level 
* PB  (as this price level, by defi-
nition, maximizes profits) and to change prices (see the second term in the square 
brackets of (3.17)). In KIMOD, the last term in the square brackets of (3.17) is mod-
elled as the deviation of the price inflation of the firm (
,,
1 ln ln
iY P G iY P G
ts ts PB PB ++ − − ) from the  
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trend rate of inflation in the economy, 
YPG




  () ( ) () ( )
,
2 2 ,, *, ,
1 1
ln 0
argmin 1 ln ln ln ln ,
iY P G
t
YPG s i YPG YPG i YPG i YPG
tt s t s t s t s
PB s
E b d PB PB d PB PB π
∞
−+ + + + −
=
⎧⎫ ⎡ ⎤ −− + − − ⎨⎬ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭ ∑ (3.18) 
Equation (3.18) is a very flexible tool for modelling pricing behaviour. As  1 d → , the 
behaviour becomes more and more myopic (non-forward looking), and, in the limit, 
,,
1 ln ln
YPG iY P G iY P G
tt PB PB π − =+ , i.e. the firm follows the expected general price develop-
ment of the economy. On the other hand, as  0 d → , the firm becomes more and more 
forward looking and in the limit set its price equal to the equilibrium price, 
,* iY P G
tt PB PB = . 
Equation (3.18) is a forward looking quadratic problem and the solution takes the 
form: 





ln ln ln ,
1
j
YPG iY P G iY P G Y P G
tt t t j
j
eb d








− ∑  (3.19) 
where e is a function of b  and d .
28  
For an adjustment cost between zero and one, 01 d << , the firm is forward looking 
and has an infinite horizon. In practice, we need to truncate the horizon, which will 
be a subjective choice, i.e. choosing the number of leads and lags in equation (3.19). 
The price equation has to respect homogeneity in prices. This means that the weights 
in the lead and lag polynomials must add up to one. 
The general structure of the pricing equations in KIMOD can be described as follows, 
where the expected price level 
* PB  is substituted for marginal cost (MC ): 
  () ( )()
,,
01 2 1,
iY P G iY P G
tt t PB f f A L PB f B F MC =+ + −  (3.20) 
where  i f  are parameters,  () A L  represents the finite lag polynomial in any price level 
and  () ()
1 B FB L
− =  is the lead operator. In order to give a specific example of the 
general structure of equation (3.20), we assume that no future values are taken into 
                                     
26 This is not a restriction. One could for example assume that 
,
1 ln ln
YPG YPG E YPG
t tt PB PB π − =− , where 
, YPG E
t PB  is the expected general price level in period t.  
27 Although Calvo (1983) does not include any explicit costs of changing prices, his model generates a 
similar minimization problem. 
28 More specifically, e  is the positive root from:  () ( ) () () ()
2




account, i.e.  0 s =  in equation (3.18), and solve for the price 
, iY P G PB  that minimizes 
the loss:  
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tt
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as  PB MC =  in equilibrium. The information structure in KIMOD is such that vari-
ables in the current period are usually not known by the agents. As a result, agents 
must form expectations (superscript “E”) about aggregate price and marginal cost 
levels in the current period and these terms will thus be treated as lead variables. 
The modelling of expectations is discussed in section 3.4. 
Finally, in order to satisfy the relative price structure of the Flex-price model, here 
represented by () /
FP YPG PB P , we extend the expression of ln
E
t MC  in equation (3.21): 
  ( ) () ( )
,0
12 2 2 ln ln 1 ln 1 ln ln ,
FP YPG








=+ + − + − + ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟
⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
(3.22) 
where the term in the square brackets reduces to ln
E
t MC  in equilibrium. In short, we 
have introduced a pricing structure that allows for both backward and forward look-
ing behaviour where the former can be explained by different types of restrictions of 
flexible price setting.  
3.3.2  Nominal prices 
In this section, we apply the generic price equation in (3.21) on some important 
prices in the Sticky-price model.  
 
Price of gross production 
Production is carried out by two types of producers, as discussed in chapter 2. The 
first type uses capital and labour to produce an intermediary domestic good and the 
second type simply puts intermediate domestic and imported goods together. The 
firms of the first type have marginal costs in form of rental prices for capital and 
nominal labour costs. The generic price equation in (3.21) is applied on the price of 
gross production (
YPG PB ) in equation (3.23) below. We have added a term for the  
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output gap (ln ln
FP
tt YY − ) to mimic the observed positive correlation between the 
output gap and prices:
29 
  ( ) () ( )
22 3
1 ln ln 1 ln ln ln .
YPG YPG PBYPG YPG PBYPG LEAD PBYPG FP
tt t t t PB PB PB Y Y ηπ η η − =+ + − + − (3.23) 
The leading variable 
LEAD PB  can be compared with 
E MC  in equation (3.21). From 
equation (3.22) we then know that: 
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⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 (3.24) 
Currently, we let ln
LEAD
t PB  be a function of expected prices and marginal costs in the 
current period and the two periods after that: 
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⎡⎤ =+ − + ⎣⎦
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π  is the trend change in nominal marginal costs (assumed here to be con-
stant). Note that  1 ln
E
t P+  reflects expectations in period t about the GDP deflator in 
period t+1 and so on. Note, finally, that we need to adjust future price expectations 
(for example,  1 ln
E
t P+ ) for the future trend inflation rate (
YPG
π ) in order to “discount” 
future prices so that they be expressed as period t values.  
Marginal costs and mark-ups 
In equilibrium, perfect competition applies so that marginal costs equal prices and no 
mark-ups are present. Although we do not model imperfect competition explicitly, 
the Sticky-price model allows for time-varying mark-ups. More specifically, we define 
marginal costs as the relationship between the nominal wage ( NW ) and the equilib-
rium real wage (
, P FP W ). The latter is close to the equilibrium marginal product of 
labour (
FP MPL ). Hence, the marginal cost could thus be said to represent unit labour 
costs: 
                                     
29 Note that prices and the output gap are determined simultaneously. Hence, we can not say that the 




























We calibrate the nominal wage dynamics to be stickier than producer prices in the 
short run. This implies that producer prices increase faster than wages, given a posi-
tive temporary demand shock. The positive spread between prices and marginal costs 
in the first phase of the shock is interpreted as a pro-cyclical, although implicitly de-
fined, mark-up. Eventually wages picks up speed and real wages increase so that, in 
the longer run, all nominal prices and wages have increased by the same amount. The 
latter is a general feature of macroeconomic models with inflation targeting and 
nominal neutrality.  
Price of public sector production 
The price equation of public sector production (
G Y ) is mainly cost driven, as in the 
National Accounts. The public production deflator (
YG PB ) adjusts to increases in 
nominal wages and to depreciation (δ ) of the public capital (
G K ), so that: 
  .
GG







α =+  (3.28) 
By introducing the parameter α , we can allow nominal wage costs per hour to differ 
from those of the private sector ( t NW ). Note that equation (3.28) implicitly assumes 
that there is no stickiness in the government’s pricing behaviour. The assumption is 
natural for two reasons. First, the deflator seldom represents actual prices, at least 
not market prices. Second, we have no specific knowledge of the dynamic nature of 
public charging.  
Exports 
In the current version of the model, we do not assume any dynamic specification at 
all for the price behaviour of exporting firms. Instead, export prices follow the equi-
librium relative price movements () /
FP X PP of the Flex-price model. Formally, we 
have the following simple export price (
















The import price 
M P  is measured in domestic currency. It will therefore depend on 
the nominal exchange rate  NER. For importing firms, we assume that a share of the 
importing costs measured in the foreign currency can be passed on to the consumers, 
although not fully in the short run. There is also a positive response to increases in 
domestic demand, modelled as the output gap () ln ln
FP
tt YY − . The import price equa-
tion is: 
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π  is the trend inflation rate of import prices (assumed to be constant here), 
, M F P  is the price of import goods denominated in foreign currency and 
_ PMP Z  is a 
constant. Equation (3.30) is derived from the real exchange rate equation 2.69 in the 
Flex-price model (see chapter 2) and implies that import prices are sticky and do not 
respond one-to-one to changes in the nominal exchange rate in the short run. 
Private consumption 
The price of private consumption (
C P ) including taxes (
C τ ) is given by: 
  () 1,
CC C
tt PP B τ =+  (3.31) 
where 
C PB  is the consumption deflator at basic prices. This variable, in turn, is as-
sumed to follow the general trend set by the core inflation measure (CORE, see sec-
tion 3.6 below), and to respect the relative price development from the flex price 
model, () /
FP C PP: 
  () ( ) 11 ln ln ln ln 1 ln ln .
FP C
C PBC C PBC
tt t t t
t
P




⎜⎟ =+ − + − + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
  (3.32) 
The core inflation is determined by unit labour costs and import prices (see section 
3.6 below). 
 
Public consumption  
 
58
The price of public consumption is, like the price of public production, not a market 
price. The price, including taxes (
G τ ), is given by: 
  () 1,
GG G
tt PP B τ =+  (3.33) 
where 
G PB  is the public consumption deflator at basic prices. The latter is driven by 
the cost of buying private sector services (
H G ) at basic prices (
YPG PB ) and the cost of 
public production (
YG G PB Y ). The equation below mimics the one in the National Ac-
counts.  
  .
YPG H YG G
G tt t t
t
tt
PB G PB Y
PB
GG
=+  (3.34) 
Investment 
Finally, investment prices are not explicitly modelled. They are determined residu-
ally, using the nominal GDP identity for final demand, that is: 
  .
CGI X M
tt t t t t t t t t t t PY P C P G P I P X P M =++ + −  (3.35) 
3.3.3  Nominal wage setting 
In the Flex-price model, real wages are determined by the Nash bargaining solution 
of an individual firm and an unemployed person (see chapter 2). As all individual 
bargaining outcomes turn out to be identical, higher wage claims imply higher unem-
ployment and lower search costs for the firms. In the negotiations between a single 
firm and a single unemployed person, however, both parts act without taking into 
account the repercussions on the general equilibrium outcome. 
Although the above wage bargaining structure might be a reasonable approximation 
in equilibrium, it is not likely to be a good explanation of how nominal wages are set 
in disequilibrium with imperfect information and bounded rationality. In order to 
capture these realistic features, nominal wage setting is modelled in analogy with the 
firms’ generic pricing equation, see (3.21) and (3.23). Equation (3.36) below is a gen-
eral formulation of nominal wages NW : 
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π  is the trend change in nominal wages (assumed to be constant here).
30 
The forward looking part (
LEAD NW ) of equation (3.36) depends on expected nominal 
wages (
E NW ), expected prices (
E P ), the equilibrium real wage (




  ( )
, ln ln ,ln ln , .
NW LEAD E E P FP
tt t t NW f NW P W π =  (3.37) 
Currently, two lags and two leads are applied in the nominal wage equation. In short, 
nominal wages are set in a fashion similar to that of the model of overlapping con-
tracts in Taylor (1980). That is, in each period only a part of the labour market con-
tracts are renegotiated. In these negotiations, firms and workers look backward on 
the contracts that were negotiated previous periods and they look forward and form 
expectations about the likely contracts that will be settled in future periods. As can 
be seen from equation (3.37) above, these expectations concern both future nominal 
wages and prices while the future equilibrium real wage is assumed to be known.  
3.4  Expectation formation 
In the price and wage equations above, variables representing expectations (those 
with superscript “E”) have been included. In this section, we show how expectations 
are modelled in KIMOD. First, however, we need to recapitulate a bit. 
The short-run dynamics of KIMOD can be understood as stemming from three 
sources. The first (intrinsic) part originates from fixed adjustment costs (e.g. long-
term contracts and menu costs) and was discussed above in the price and wage equa-
tions. The second part, which we will discuss in this section, originates from expecta-
tion formation, i.e. the assumption of  imperfectly rational expectations at business 
cycle frequency. The third part is the dynamics generated by the policy rules. This is 
discussed in section 3.6.  
There is a clear distinction between the first two parts of stickiness – fixed adjust-
ment costs and expectation formation. We are interested in separating adjustment 
costs into one part that is immune to policy changes (i.e. to the Lucas critique) and 
one that is not. As will be clear in this section, fixed adjustment costs are immune to 
                                     
30 This nominal trend change is equal to the sum of the change in the real wage rate of the Flex-price 
model (i.e. the result of the Nash bargaining solution) and the inflation target.  
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policy changes (for example, a new inflation target) while the formation of expecta-
tion can be affected by policy.  
In the modelling of expectations in highly aggregated models, weights are assigned to 
backward and forward looking variables. This structure can be interpreted in at least 
two ways. One interpretation is that every agent does a little bit of this and a little 
bit of that, i.e. every agent is partially backward-looking and partially forward-
looking. Another possible interpretation is that different groups in the society behave 
differently. For instance, some consumers are “rules-of-thumb” consumers and act in 
a backward-looking way while the rest of the consumers are truly forward-looking. 
We do not restrict ourselves to either of these interpretations.  
Expectations are explicitly modelled as separate equations and are formed as convex 
combinations of backward and forward looking parts. We start with the backward 
looking part. We want a fairly general structure that allows us to readily change the 
length of the backward looking part (that is, how many periods backwards in history 
agents are assumed to consider when forming expectations) and extend it linearly 
into the future. Consider:  
  () 11 1 ln ln ln ln ,
E
ti t t t j PP k P P +− − − − =+ −  (3.38) 
where 
E
ti P+  is the price level in period t+i as expected at time t and j is the length of 
the historic sample that the agents consider. We now need a way to calculate the 
parameter k  in such a way that it (i) captures the unweighted average growth during 
the backward looking period (here t-1-j) and (ii) project’s i periods ahead using this 








































where  π  is the observed mean growth between t–4 and t–1. Hence, equation (3.40) 
shows that our (linear) forecast of t+2 dated in period t is 3 times the average his-
toric growth computed between t–4  and t–1.  
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Now we add a forward looking part (with the weight 1
E P η − ) by using the model con-
sistent (that is, rational) value ( ti P+ ) for our forward prediction: 
  () () 11 ln 1 ln ln 1 ln .
E E EP P
ti t t j ti Pk P k P P ηη +− − − + ⎡⎤ =+− + − ⎣⎦  (3.41) 
Due to the random walk behaviour of price levels in a model with an inflation target 
for monetary policy, there is no economically plausible interpretation of nominal 
“equilibrium” levels in the long run. For volumes and relative prices, on the other 
hand, we do have well defined equilibrium values. For these variables (in equation 
(3.42) exemplified below by “X”), we thus expand the convex combination to include 
the equilibrium value (
FP X ) as an attractor: 
  () ( ) 11 1 21 2 11 .
E FP
ti t t j ti ti X lk X k X l X l l X +− − − + + ⎡⎤ =+− ++ − − ⎣⎦  (3.42) 
Finally, for variables demanding very long forward horizons, the number i being 
large, we need to be able to downplay the backward looking information against the 
forward looking one, based on the assumption that people eventually will learn, al-
though there is no explicit model for how agents learn in KIMOD. Consider: 
  () () () () 11 1 2 1 2 11 ,
Ei i F P
ti t t j ti ti Xl m k X k Xl Xl m l X +− − − + + ⎡⎤ =+ − + + − − ⎣⎦  (3.43) 
where the parameter m , 01 m << , is used to downplay the backward looking part of 
(3.43) when i increases. Equation (3.43) implies that expected values further into the 
future (i.e. when i increases) will have increasing weight on the equilibrium value and 
decreasing weight on the historic information. This is helpful to speed up convergence 
towards the new equilibrium if the economy is hit by a permanent shock. By using 
large values for m , we are in effect assuming that people are slow “learners”. As 
mentioned earlier, we do not have an explicit theory of learning in KIMOD and if we 
truncate the forward horizon heavily, this specification will only have a small impact. 
Finally, as the interested reader might have noticed, we use lagged values in the price 
and wage equations because of different types of adjustment costs (see section 3.3).  
These costs are fixed and do not change if policy changes. On the other hand, we also 
use, as we have seen in this section, lagged values in the formation of price of wage 
expectations. Hence, in the expectation formation, we assume that historic informa-
tion is beneficial (i.e. not a cost) when predicting future values. This benefit is, how-
ever, highly sensitive to policy changes (cf. the Lucas critique). If politicians try to 
exploit the way individuals form their expectations, the expectation formation will 
change. In summary, the inclusion of lags in the price/wage equations and the expec-
tation formation should be kept apart.   
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3.4.1  Trend growth rates in expectation formation 
Earlier on we showed that trend growth rates for different variables showed up in the 
non-stationary equations for prices, wages and volumes. Generically we have: 




tt t t t Pn P n P ππ −+ + =++ −− (3.44) 
where 
, P E π  is the expected growth of price P . Although we assumed for simplicity 
that 
, P E π  is constant and equal to the trend growth, this needs not to be the case. As 




tt PP π − =− is one alternative where ln
E
t P  could be 
determined by equation (3.41).  
However, in the expectation formulations we let the individuals know the trend 
growth (
P
π ) for certain, i.e, we exclude superscript “E”:
31 
  () ( ) ( ) () ( ) 11 1* 1 * .
E E PP P EP P
ti t t j ti Pk P k P j P i ηπ π η π +− − − +
⎡⎤ =+ + − ++ −− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 (3.45) 
3.5  Exchange rates and UIP 
In modern macro modelling, forward looking behaviour is the natural benchmark. 
This is especially true in a model designed to be used in policy analysis. KIMOD is 
developed exactly to support such studies and incorporates an explicit modelling of 
expectation formation, as we saw in the above section.  
A model just needs one forward looking variable to become messy to analyse numeri-
cally. The reason is that this variable will in a particular year depend on the rest of 
the model and one needs to compute the full time profile for all variables before the 
forward looking one can be solved. 
Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) is exactly such an economic relation. It incorporates 
one forward looking variable, i.e. the expectation of the next period value for the 
nominal exchange rate, but the solution requires the time path for both domestic and 
foreign nominal interest rates as well. The domestic interest rate, in turn, is deter-
mined by the monetary policy authority and their decision presupposes the full model 
calculation of the variables included in the model.  
                                     
31 The alternative to include an expectation based 
, P E π  in the expectation formation equations is not 
satisfying for obvious reasons.  
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In KIMOD, the determination of the nominal variables connected to monetary policy 
“starts” with the determination of the expected real exchange rate. We do not de-
scribe this process in terms of cause and effects, since everything is solved simultane-
ously. Yet there is something to be learned from how the software Troll solves such a 
forward looking problem. Given a tentative solution of the expected next period value 
for the real exchange rate ( 1
E
t RER + ) and the expected domestic price level ( 1
E
t P+ ), we 
solve for the expected nominal exchange rate ( 1
E
t NER + ):  
  11 1 1 ln ln ln ln ,
EE F E
tt t t NER RER P P ++ + + =− +  (3.46) 
where  1
F
t P+  is the foreign GDP deflator. Now, equipped with the short term nominal 
interest rate paths, we use UIP to solve for the current value for the nominal ex-
change rate: 
  () () 1 ln ln ln 1 ln 1 ,
EF
tt t t NER NER NR NR + =− + + +  (3.47) 
where 
F NR  is the foreign nominal interest rate. This means that the current value of 
the nominal exchange rate adjusts (jumps) to accommodate differences between inter-
est rate paths in order to prohibit arbitrage opportunities. It is well known that UIP 
is often rejected in empirical work. Still, it is a necessary ingredient in a consistent 
forecast. We cannot have known “free lunches” in a consistent description of future 
developments. 
The interest rate path, in turn, is the central bank response to the inflation-
ary/deflationary pressure due to the recent shocks. As such, the central bank re-
sponse involves, and is based on, the impact of interest rates on nominal and real 
exchange rates and the latter variables’ repercussions on net exports. Finally, because 
of the Fisher relation, nominal interest rates translate into expected real interest 
rates ( t R ) which, in turn, will have an impact on domestic private consumption and 
business investment: 
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This overall specification, together with the neutrality assumption on monetary pol-
icy, means that the lasting effect of monetary policy actions (as well as temporary 
shocks) on price levels is the same for all nominal variables and that domestic prices 
respect relative PPP. Although the model is specified to respect UIP both in real and 
nominal terms, it is easy to show that temporary shocks to the policy rule or the 
nominal exchange rate will momentarily produce deviations from pure theory predic-
tion due to transitory expectation errors. 
3.6  Core inflation 
According to the law governing the conduct of monetary policy, the central bank in 
Sweden is responsible for maintaining price stability. The central bank has made its 
objective operational as a 2  percent annual increase in the consumer price index 
(CPI) with a margin of  1 ±  percentage point. Due to specific features of the CPI in-
dex, the central bank instead targets a measure of core inflation, also called UND1X. 
3.6.1  Modelling the target rate 
The highly aggregated nature of KIMOD prohibits replicating the CPI. However, the 
core inflation measure should in some way be a function of endogenous variables, and 
monetary policy should affect these variables. To fulfill these requirements, we have 
settled on a specification of consumer prices from the producer’s point of view. The 
core measure ( t CORE ) is modelled as a weighted average of unit labour costs (ULC ) 
and import prices (
M P ): 
  ln ln ln ,




PB C P C
CORE ULC P
PB C PB C
Δ= Δ + Δ  (3.51) 
where the weights in front of ULC  and 
M P  sum to one and equal, respectively, the 
share of consumption produced at home (
H C ) and abroad (
F C ).  
In KIMOD, we try to simultaneously mimic different features of the data. The time 
series for the import deflator 
M
t P  and  t ULC  are fairly volatile and, at the same time, 
the measures for domestic inflation (UNDH1X) and imported inflation (UNDIMP1X) 
are peculiarly sticky and smooth, as is the core measure (UND1X) from Statistics 
Sweden itself. In order to succeed with these diverse endeavours, we need to smooth  
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the series included in the core equation as well as KIMODs core measure itself. In the 
calibration, we have to balance this sticky feature of prices against a fairly “aggres-
sive” central bank. 
3.7  Monetary policy 
The central bank is responsible for creating and sustaining conditions in which public 
expectations are consistent with the goals for monetary policy. Since 1993, Sweden 
has chosen an explicit inflation targeting regime, with an explicit target for consumer 
price inflation. The central bank does have a monopoly in supplying the economy 
with currencies and overnight loans, which gives it the possibility to peg the short 
term nominal interest rate (i.e. the “repo rate”), according to its perception of the 
current liquidity position of the banking system.  
The central bank needs to be forward looking, due to the time lag between action 
and effect, and it also needs to have an explicit view of the transmission mechanism 
that will transmit the interest rate movements into a successful implementation of 
the policy goal. The central bank carries out forecasts on economic variables, condi-
tioning upon its own actions at least two years ahead. It trades off the importance in 
reaching the target in the shortest possible time with the costs that this policy will 
impose on the economy, i.e. the output loss and unemployment associated with man-
aging the monetary policy in an environment with less than perfect credibility. With 
perfect credibility there are, of course, no costs at all in changing policy. 
KIMOD does not have an interest rate rule explicitly dependent on output or unem-
ployment gaps in the sense of Svensson (2000), and the modelled central bank does 
not conduct optimal monetary policy. The central bank is assumed to set interest 
rates within a two year horizon, conditioned on an inflation forecast that is supplied 
by the model. This forecast is equal to the model consistent solution of future core 
inflation, which amounts to a perfect foresight assumption. Uncertainty is addressed 
by the inclusion of a weight on last period monetary stance, suggesting a dislike to 
move quickly upon the latest information (i.e. a smoothing behaviour). The policy 
rule is: 
  () () ( ) ( )
22 1 *
12 11 1 1 l n ,
NR NR FP NR
tt t t NR NR NR CORE η ηη π −+ += + + − + + Δ − (3.52) 
where 
* π  is the inflation target and 
FP NR  is the equilibrium nominal interest rate. 
The central bank law dictates the central bank’s responsibility for consumer price 
stability and allows other considerations only if they can be implemented without  
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jeopardising the main objective. It is possible to pay explicit attention to employ-
ment, unemployment or the output gap in the rule but it is not necessary from a 
model perspective. The channel behind price stabilisation goes through the output 
gap which means that the rule implicitly takes that into consideration. By an ade-
quate choice of the parameters in the rule including the length of the horizon, one 
can always mimic a rule with an explicit role for the output gap.  
For demand shocks, there is no trade off in the first place, but supply shocks generate 
a conflict between the two goals. This will show up as a more cautionary and gradual 
behaviour in that the central bank wants to raise and lower interest rates at the same 
time. This gradual behaviour induces longer and larger deviations for inflation rela-
tive to the target rate and could well be mimicked by a greater weight on historic 
rates and a lesser on the inflation gap. 
In the class of models where KIMOD belongs, it is in general impossible to derive an 
optimal monetary policy rule analytically. That leaves one with the question of 
whether to try to model the perceived behaviour of the central bank for forecasting or 
to develop a conditional optimization rule. The latter will be optimal conditional on 
the chosen structure of the model and the set of shocks applied. In the current work 
we have chosen another strategy. As described in Chapter 4, parameters (including 
those in the reaction function of the central bank) are chosen taking the full system 
properties into account. In some way one can say that we close the model by calibrat-
ing the monetary policy rule.  
Monetary policy is thus assumed to be both neutral and super neutral, i.e. it has no 
permanent effect on real variables or on the rate of growth. Nominal shocks will give 
rise to transitory inflationary impulses which in the end produce drift in the levels of 
prices but nothing more. 
3.8  Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy is modelled in the same way as in the Steady state and Flex-price mod-
els. This partly reflects the fact that modelling fiscal policy at business cycle fre-
quency has so far not been a priority in developing KIMOD 1.0. The only difference 
with the Flex-price model is that we include error-correction terms in the equations 
for government production and government consumption, to account for the case in 
which the starting values do not correspond to the values of the Flex-price model.  
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The labour income tax (
W τ ) is endogenous in the Sticky-price model and ensures that 
the equilibrium level of government net position as a percentage of GDP is reached: 
 
__
1 (1 ) ,
MP G MP G





τχ τ χ τχ −
⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞




_ M P P  is the relative price between imports and the GDP deflator and 
_ /
MP G PB Y  is the government nominal net asset position in relation to nominal GDP. 
3.9  Production, tax wedges and productivity 
Production is determined by demand in the Sticky-price model. The indirect taxes 
impose a wedge between GDP to market prices (demand) and GDP to basic prices 
(production). Formally, the following nominal identity defines private and public 
production: 
  () ( ) 1,
YL YP P YG G
tt t t t t PY PB Y PB Y τ =+ +  (3.54) 
where 
YL τ  is used as the correct, exogenous measure of the wedge. Both sides of the 
identity represent added value although measured at different prices. It is tempting 
to think of the different Y  as volumes and use them to formulate a volume identity, 
similar to equation (3.54). With the chain index system of the National Account, this 
is not correct, however, except for the base year and the preceding year. For other 
years, the volume parts do not generally add up. The endogenous variable 
Y τ  is in-
troduced to capture the “chain index drift”: 
  () ( ) 1,
YPG
tt t YY Y τ =+ +  (3.55) 
where 
Y τ  converges to the flex-price value according to: 
  ()
,
11 1 0.5 .
YY Y Y F P
tt t t ττ ττ −− − =+ −  (3.56) 
Public production, 
G Y , is determined by the government sector experts at the NIER. 
Equation (3.55) determines private production (
P
t Y ). With production given by equa-
tion (3.55), and with employment explained in section 3.2.9, private sector’s produc-
tivity (
H A ) can be solved and interpreted as a business cycle residual by inverting 
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where added value production (
P Y  in equation (3.55)) is transformed into gross pro-
duction (
PG Y ), in order to use the production function. This is obtained by the iden-
tity: 
  ,
YP P YPG PG FP
tt t t t PB Y PB Y COST =−  (3.58) 
where the cost variable consists of installation cost of capital and vacancy costs. This 
is exogenous in the Sticky-price model and equal to the flex-price equilibrium value.  
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4  Calibration 
In the class of models where KIMOD belongs, specifications run from highly abstract 
and theoretic equations to very hands-on National Accounting identities. To accom-
modate this, the values for the different parameters in the three models which consti-
tute KIMOD are chosen in a fairly eclectic way. The ideal method would be a full 
system estimation of the entire model which would respect all the relevant cross-
restrictions. A full system estimation is unfortunately not a realistic option, however, 
for several reasons. The amount of parameters is quite large and the model frequency 
is annual, so that the degrees of freedom would be in short supply. Furthermore, ma-
jor structural shocks hit the Swedish economy in 1990–1992. On top of this, Statistics 
Sweden changed radically its way of measuring GDP components in the mid-1990s. 
On the other hand, we cannot rely entirely on an eclectic calibration approach that 
borrows from the research literature. Firstly, the research literature is seldom repre-
sentative for Sweden. Parameter estimations mostly exploit data from other countries 
whose economic institutions may be quite different from those of Sweden. Moreover, 
KIMOD needs a spectrum of parameters of very different types. Some are true repre-
sentations of technology and preferences, classical “deep parameters”, some are ex-
ogenous rates of growth, and some are weights in fairly general dynamic specifica-
tions. 
In practice, we end up with a mixed strategy which we can compactly state as:  
“Estimate when possible, then calibrate  
to generate reasonable behaviour as a system“ 
 
The sources/methods used to calibrate KIMOD can be summarized in four points: 
•  Results from mainstream economic literature 
•  Own estimates on Swedish data 
•  Focus on the system, not single variables 
•  Impulse-response analysis 
The last point is discussed further in chapter 5.  
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4.1  Treating different frequencies differently 
Basically, KIMOD’s three parts can be envisioned as a three parts decomposition of a 
generic time series into different frequencies. The parts of the model supposed to 
trace out medium term to long run behaviour, i.e. the Flex-price model and the 
Steady-state model, are moistly driven by unobserved equilibrium variables. These 
can only be assessed through their impact on the end product, that is, the sticky 
price variables.  
In the Steady-state model, most parameters are chosen to yield a static replication of 
the NIER’s common view on steady state levels, with some additional calibrated dy-
namic parameters. By choosing parameters in this way one has to face the trade off 
between striving for the correct levels and trend rates and influencing the compara-
tive static performance. In order to illustrate the last argument, consider the follow-















In this trivial example, one has to choose the parameters { } ,, abc  to induce correct 
steady state levels and ratios, as well as correct comparative static’s (i.e. elasticities). 
On top of that, the parameters should induce an appropriate dynamic behaviour. If 
only the parameter b is used in order to respect certain steady state conditions, the 
decision will have a direct impact on the dynamics. If one instead uses the intercepts 
(i.e.  ) a , one could end up with undesired comparative static properties. 
There are more dimensions to the problem. Parameters differ not only as to their 
functional aspects, as described above, but to their interpretation as well. Many pa-
rameters are hybrids in the sense that, in a small model, the parameters have to 
carry too much of the explanation. Consider, as an example, consumer theory and the 
choice of a utility function to represent household preferences. In a realistic descrip-
tion, one might want to model saving decisions, intertemporal substitution, risk aver-
sion and precautionary decisions. In a complex specification all this can be parameter-
ised but if one has settled for a log utility specification, as we have, then there are 
actually no parameters at all to accommodate the model! 
Another example is the parameter  , π  which represents the probability for survival in 
the equilibrium part of KIMOD. It will determine the life expectancy of the house-
holds, the discrepancy between social and private discount factor and the degree (or  
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lack) of Ricardian equivalence. Now, if one has some sort of information, or opinion, 
on the magnitude of all of these features, which one should govern the choice forπ ? 
Furthermore, some of the theoretically based mechanisms, such as installation costs 
for capital goods, much needed to yield plausible adjustment rates, cannot be ex-
tracted from data directly.  Such parameters are in actual practice used in a more 
“residual” way, so that they are used to “close” the model. Technically speaking, 
they are treated as endogenous variables and given an imputed value. 
For the less stringent theoretical parts of the model, that is, for the Sticky-price 
model, we have chosen another strategical mix. Volumes and real rigidities are esti-
mated, whereas prices, expectations and policy rules are calibrated. For instance, we 
have to balance the “excess” rigidity and perfect foresight in the core-measure of in-
flation with a fairly aggressive monetary policy reaction. 
To sum up, all the parameters in the full system will actually resemble coefficients in 
a VAR-model. The absolute value of a specific coefficient or parameter cannot tell 
much. One needs to study the dynamic behaviour of the full system, mostly with the 
help of impulse-response experiments. For a thorough discussion of this, see chapter 
5. 
4.2  The gradual approach 
Models never provide the final answers to questions posed at a forecasting institute, 
and we take a similar stance on the calibration issues. Theoretical insights, equation 
specifications and parameterization are always going to change and develop. 
We start out with estimated coefficients or parameters borrowed from the literature 
and adjust them to give the system the desired properties. Frequent use of the model 
in the forecasting process will eventually give the modellers more information that 
will enable an updating of one’s initial specifications.   
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5  Dynamic model properties 
To illustrate the dynamic properties of KIMOD 1.0, this chapter reports the model’s 
responses to various shocks. Several relevant shock simulations help to illustrate the 
dynamic behaviour of KIMOD. Section 5.1 describes five permanent shocks: A pro-
ductivity shock, a labour supply shock, a permanent shock to the relative bargain 
strength of the workers, a reduction in the ratio of government debt to GDP and a 
shock to the inflation target. In section 5.2 we focus on five transitory shocks: a shock 
to nominal wages, a shock to the nominal exchange rate, an interest rate shock, a 
temporary labour supply shock and a shock to household spending. 
We have chosen these shocks to illustrate the interaction of households, firms and 
policymakers in goods, labour and financial markets. By definition, a transitory shock 
does not alter any flex-price or steady state values. For example, a shock to house-
hold spending that is of temporary nature will affect relative prices, nominal prices 
and volumes in the short run while equilibrium values in the Steady state and Flex-
price models are unaltered. A permanent shock, on the other hand, affects equilib-
rium values of output and relative prices. A permanent shock must therefore be in-
troduced both in the Steady state, Flex-price, and Sticky-price models. In practice, a 
permanent shock is first introduced in the Steady state model which describes the 
static long run effect. Secondly, the permanent shock is introduced in the Flex-price 
model which describes the dynamic (due to real rigidities) flex-prices equilibrium path 
to the new steady state.  Finally, the shock is incorporated into the Sticky-Price 
model, which generates the business cycle response to such a shock, illustrating the 
process by which the economy reaches its new flex-price equilibrium, eventually with 
the help of appropriate stabilization policies.  
For each shock, we show a standard set of charts. For the permanent shocks we also 
show some additional charts which illustrate the sluggish adjustment in the Flex-
price model. For these shocks, the dynamic path of the Flex-price variables is shown 
as a dashed line and labelled with a suffix FP. In these figures, the development in 
the Sticky-price model is labelled with a suffix SP. 
The shocks responses are intended to highlight specific mechanisms of the model, and 
we focus on a few stylized experiments. Some points are worth noting about the na-
ture of these results. 
First, we assume that the economy is initially at its long-run equilibrium when the 
shock hits the economy. This is a different type of exercise compared to forecasting,  
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which generally describes how an economy that is away from a sustainable long-run 
equilibrium could move toward such a position. 
Second, each shock represents an isolated change of a single exogenous or endogenous 
variable. This helps to clarify the properties of the model but is a simplification com-
pared with most historical episodes and forecasts, which often involve simultaneous 
shocks to a number of variables. Moreover, in the simulation presented in this chap-
ter, we assume that the rest of the world does not respond to the shocks in Sweden. 
5.1  Permanent shocks 
This section first discusses the behaviour of the full model – Steady state, Flex-price 
and Sticky price – in face of permanent shocks to productivity, labor supply, the rela-
tive bargaining strength of workers and the ratio of government debt to GDP. These 
permanent shocks affect the equilibrium values of output and relative prices.  
Finally, we analyze a permanent nominal shock – a shock to the inflation target. In 
this case the equilibrium values of output and relative prices are unaltered, but the 
shock will have permanent effects on nominal variables. Figures 5.1 to 5.5 in Appen-
dix A show the responses of KIMOD to these shocks and table 5.1 in Appendix A 
summaries the impact on production, inflation and the output gap. 
5.1.1  A productivity shock 
Figure 5.1 shows the effect of a 1 per cent permanent increase in the level of TFP 
(total factor productivity). The productivity shock is specific to Sweden, since foreign 
output is exogenous in the simulation. This simulation is of interest because it high-
lights the importance of stock-flow dynamics and the wealth dimension of KIMOD, 
and it also illustrates how demand and policy react to supply shifts. 
In the long run, the implied increase in labour productivity is accompanied by a rise 
in real wages paid by firms. Household spending is positively affected by the higher 
wage, while investment flows rise as the desired capital stock increase. Government 
expenditure rises by the same amount as output in the long run, to restore the 
steady-state share of government. Imports rise permanently, in line with the perma-
nent increase in consumption and capital investment. The real exchange rate appreci-
ates due to the Balassa – Samulesson effect (i.e. the real exchange rate of countries 
with high productivity growth in the tradable sectors appreciates). This reduces net 
exports, but exports still rise in absolute terms (see figure 5.1.k).  
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The appreciation also has a “second-round” effect on the real economy, increasing the 
overall impact on long-run supply. This is due to the fact that the price of domesti-
cally produced goods rises, with respect to the price of  imported goods, so that Swe-
den’s terms of trade improve. This raises the ratios of imported to domestically pro-
duced consumption and capital goods. This relative price effect reduces the overall 
cost of capital, which adds to the increase in capital and output. Hence, output in-
creases more than 1 % (see figure 5.1.a). 
The exchange rate movements are associated with permanent shifts in relative prices, 
but inflation, real interest rate and nominal interest rates return to the initial equilib-
rium implied by the Riksbank’s inflation target and the world equilibrium real inter-
est rate. If this shock had been shared with the rest of the world, it would have had a 
neutral effect on the real exchange rate in the long run, and output would have risen 
by exactly 1 %. 
Turning to the short run, firms are immediately able to produce more output, for 
given inputs of capital and labour. Although demand reacts quickly, adjustment costs 
imply that the shock initially creates an excess supply. This encourages firms both to 
reduce prices to stimulate demand and to reduce their demand for labour in the short 
run (see figures 5.1.c and 5.1.f). The labour market gap, however, closes rapidly as 
demand adjusts to its new equilibrium. Monetary policy responds to low inflation, 
with lower interest rates, which stimulates demand. This prevents the inflation from 
falling further, and the inflation rate gradually rises back towards the inflation target. 
5.1.2  A labour supply shock 
In this scenario, a supply shock stems from the assumption that labour supply per-
manently increases by 1 percentage point relative to the base case scenario (see figure 
5.2). In the simulation, hours worked in the public sector are assumed to be unal-
tered. The extra supply of labour is therefore completely absorbed by the private sec-
tor in the long run. Hours worked in the private sector will therefore increase more 
than 1 % (see figure 5.2.c). 
In a small open economy model, in which there is no imported capital, a given in-
crease in employment would in the long run be matched by a proportional increase in 
capital and output. In KIMOD, however some capital goods are imported. Therefore, 
the interaction between the real exchange rate and the long-run supply discussed 
above for the case of a productivity shock means that the increase in production in 
the private sector is slightly lower than the increase in hours worked in the private  
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sector (see figures 5.2.c – 5.2.e). This is so because the real wage falls slightly and the 
cost of capital increases as the real exchange rate depreciates. 
In the long run, aggregate labour income increases because the fall in the real wage is 
less than the increase in hours worked. Household spending therefore increases, while 
investment flows rise as the desired capital stock increases. Imports rise permanently, 
in line with the permanent increase in consumption and capital investment. Exports 
increase more than imports because the real exchange rate depreciates (see figure 
5.2.k). 
Turning to the short run, the direct effect of a higher labour supply is higher unem-
ployment. Higher unemployment, and hence a negative output gap, constrains both 
nominal and real wage growth. The lower rate of wage increase is reflected in the 
pricing behaviour of the firms and the rate of inflation shrinks. The Riksbank, with 
its target of maintaining the rate of inflation at an average of 2 percent, cuts the repo 
rate in order to bring back inflation to the target. 
Lower real wages also imply that firms demand more labour. Employment increases 
sharply over the first three years, which means that the unemployment rate gradually 
falls back to the equilibrium level (see figure 5.2.a). Consumption is initially curbed 
by lower real wages and higher unemployment. 
5.1.3  A shock to the relative bargaining strength of workers 
This scenario analyzes the economic outcome when the labour market parties sud-
denly starts to show more concern for the welfare of the unemployed and will accept 
a somewhat lower real wage (see figure 5.3). Technically, this is achieved by lowering 
the relative bargaining strength of workers (see chapter 2 for a description of the la-
bour market model in KIMOD 1.0). Firms then demand more labour, which implies 
higher GDP and employment in the long run. 
The labour market parties, who now place more emphasis on the level of unemploy-
ment, settle on a lower real wage. At this new, lower real wage, firms demand more 
hours worked, partly because labour is relatively cheaper, and partly because the 
stock of capital increases as investment in Sweden becomes more profitable for a 
transitional period. Unemployment therefore drops and the number of hours worked 
rises correspondingly in the long run. 
With more hours worked, higher GDP and lower unemployment general government 
finances are permanently strengthened and the general government consumption can  
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increase. This means, therefore, that lower unemployment and higher output create a 
margin for the government for increasing general government expenditure and/or 
reducing taxes. 
More hours worked implies higher GDP. The improvement in GDP, however, is pro-
portionally lower than the increase in hours worked, since the stock of capital does 
not increase as much as the number of hours worked. The explanation for this is that 
the real exchange rate depreciates, making imported investment goods more expen-
sive. In addition, lower real wages imply that firms to some extent substitute capital 
by employing more personnel. Investment, exports and imports increase in the long 
run. Investment goes up because the stock of capital must be adjusted to the higher 
level of employment. Exports increase because prices of exports in foreign currency 
decrease. On the other hand, higher imports do not entail any change in prices of 
imports in foreign currency. Therefore, the combined impact of the increases in the 
volume of imports and exports is deterioration in the terms of trade. 
Thus, with lower equilibrium unemployment and a somewhat lower real wage, the 
number of hours worked increases, GDP rises and general government finances im-
prove. 
5.1.4  A permanent reduction in the ratio of government debt to GDP 
In this scenario, we lower the steady-state target ratio of government debt to GDP 
by 1 % (see figure 5.4.a). A permanent reduction in the ratio of government debt to 
GDP is accompanied by a rise in the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. The real ex-
change rate will therefore appreciate. This reduces net exports, but exports still rise 
in absolute terms. The appreciation also has an effect on the desired capital stock.  
This is due to the fact that the price of domestically produced goods rises relative to 
imported goods, so that terms of trade improve. This rises the ratios of imported to 
domestically produced consumption and capital goods. This relative price effect re-
duces the overall cost of capital and hence increases the desired capital stock (see 
figure 5.4.e). Higher capital stock leads to a permanent increase in potential output. 
In the long run, the increase in production is accompanied by a rise in real wages 
paid by firms. Household spending is therefore positively affected by higher wage. 
Imports rise permanently, in line with the permanent increase in consumption and 
capital investment.  
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5.1.5  A shock to the inflation target 
In this scenario, the Riksbank decides to permanently reduce the inflation target by 1 
% (see figure 5.5). To convince agents that the reduction in inflation is permanent, 
the Riksbank needs to raise the real interest rate through altering the nominal repo 
rate, due to lack of full credibility. This dampens consumption and investment in the 
short run. As a result of the initial increase in the real interest rates, both nominal 
and real exchange rates appreciate. Net exports therefore decrease in the short run. 
The nominal exchange rate will display an appreciating trend in the long run as com-
pared to the base scenario, because the domestic inflation rate is permanently re-
duced (see figure 5.5.g). 
Overall, an excess supply lasting six years and peaking at around 0.4 per cent is cre-
ated. The sacrifice ratio (i.e. the cumulative loss of output needed to reduce the infla-
tion target by 1 per cent) is 1.2 in the current calibration of KIMOD (see figure 5.5). 
5.2  Transitory shocks 
This section discusses the behaviour of KIMOD in face of transitory shocks to nomi-
nal wages, the exchange rate, the interest rate, labour supply and household con-
sumption. For these shocks, the equilibrium values of output and relative prices are 
unaltered, but they will have permanent effects on nominal variables. Figures 5.6 to 
5.10 in Appendix A show the responses of KIMOD to these shocks and table 5.2 in 
Appendix A summarize the impact on inflation and the output gap. 
5.2.1  A shock to the nominal wage 
This scenario illustrates the effects of a settlement providing for wage increases that 
are 1 % higher for one year (see figure 5.6), as compared to the base scenario. Firms 
react in the short run to the increase in wage costs by reducing both their output and 
the number of their employees. 
The higher rate of wage increases is reflected in the pricing behaviour of firms, and 
the rate of inflation increases (see figure 5.6.b). The Riksbank, with its target of 
maintaining the rate of inflation at an average of 2 %, initially raises the repo rate 
and then gradually lowers it again to its original level. 
As a result of the initial increase in interest rates, both real and nominal exchange 
rates appreciate. Net exports decrease, as the real exchange rate appreciates in the 
short run. Investment is negatively affected by higher real interest rates and lower  
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output. Higher real wages imply a higher disposable income, which stimulates con-
sumption. However, consumption is curbed by higher real interest rates and higher 
unemployment. The net effect on consumption is therefore close to zero in both the 
short and the medium term. The aggregate effect on GDP is shown in figure 5.6.b. At 
most we have a negative output gap of 0.1 %. The number of hours worked is lower 
than in the main scenario (the labour market gap in hours worked is the same as the 
output gap in this scenario, because labour productivity is not effected). Unemploy-
ment is highest after about 3 years. 
Thus, this simulation illustrates how a higher wage settlement can affect the economy 
negatively (i.e. lower output and hours worked compared to the base case scenario). 
5.2.2  A shock to the nominal exchange rate 
In this scenario, there is a 1 % temporary depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
for one year (see figure 5.7). Hence, in this simulation the agents in the economy 
know (expect) that the exchange rate will be weaker for exactly one year and act ac-
cording to that. The direct channel through which this variable affects the economy 
is relative import prices, exports and the relative investment prices. The weaker ex-
change rate leads to a 0.2 % increase in net exports around year one of the simula-
tion. The positive effect in net exports is offset by a deterioration in investment, 
peaking at about 0.2 % after 3 years. This negative response in investment is mainly 
attributed to the higher real interest rates. The shock has virtually no impact in the 
other components of domestic demand. The output gap is increased by around 0.25 % 
at its peak. 
Inflation is higher than in the base case scenario in line with the output gap response 
and the increase in import prices. It peaks at about after three years. Reacting to the 
expected inflation gap, the Riksbank raises the repo rate by slightly less than 0.5 per-
centage points. 
5.2.3   A shock to the interest rate (“Policy shock”) 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the responses of the model to a shock of 50 basis points in the 
nominal interest rate for one year. It is designed to show the impact of interest 
changes on the economy. In the other simulations presented in this chapter, interest 
rates react endogenously to movements in inflation and expected inflation that come 
about because of some other shocks. Here, we start instead with an interest rate 
movement and follow the reaction of the remaining variables of the model.  In par-
ticular, we fix the nominal interest rate for one year at a level 50 basis point higher  
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than the equilibrium interest rate (see figure 5.8). After that period the Riksbank will 
again react according to the normal reaction function. 
The increase in the nominal interest rate leads immediately to an increase in the real 
interest rate, and hence the cost of borrowing to finance consumption and invest-
ment. Also, the nominal and the real exchange rate immediately appreciate with the 
increase in the interest rate. 
Higher interest rates reduce both consumption and investment in the early years of 
the simulation. At its peak, consumption is about 0.3 % lower than in the base case, 
and investment is about 1.0 % lower than the base case scenario. This reflects the 
greater sensitivity of investment to interest rates. Exports fall in response to the ini-
tial appreciation in the exchange rate.  Imports fall as well, as the short-run effect 
that results from the reduction in private income dominates. The effect on net ex-
ports is therefore quite small. 
Faced with unchanged potential supply, firms immediately reduce factor utilization 
and start reducing employment. Hours worked decrease and the unemployment rate 
increases (see figure 5.8.c). 
Inflation falls below the starting point as firms react to the fall in demand. Also, 
nominal and real wages fall back quickly as a result of lower demand for labour. 
The shock lasts for one year. After one year, the Riksbank reverts to its standard 
reaction function. Faced with a negative output gap and inflation below target, the 
Riksbank responds rapidly and cuts the interest rate aggressively to bring inflation 
back to target (see figure 5.8.a). 
5.2.4  A temporary labour supply shock 
In this scenario, a supply shock stems from a temporary increase in labour supply by 
1 percentage point, relative to the base case scenario (see figure 5.9). The direct effect 
of a higher labour supply is higher unemployment; the unemployment rate initially 
increases by almost 1 percentage point (from 4.7 to 5.7 %). 
Higher unemployment constrains both the nominal and real wage growth. After two 
years the nominal wage increase is around 1 % lower than in the base case scenario 
(see figure 5.9.h). The lower rate of wage increase is reflected in the pricing behaviour 
of the firms and the rate of inflation is lower. The Riksbank, with its target of main-
taining the rate of inflation at an average of 2 %, initially cuts the repo rate and then 
gradually increases it again to its original level.  
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Lower real wages also imply that firms demand more labour. Both average hours 
worked and the number of workers increase and unemployment falls (see figure 5.9.c). 
As a result of the initial cut in the nominal interest rate, both the real and the nomi-
nal exchange rates depreciate. Net exports therefore increase, as the real exchange 
rate depreciates in the short run. Investment is positively affected by higher produc-
tion and lower real interest rates. Consumption is initially curbed by lower real wages 
and higher unemployment. 
5.2.5  A demand shock  
This scenario analyzes the effects of a positive demand shock stemming from house-
hold spending which increases by 1 % (see figure 5.10 and table 5.2). The shock lasts 
for one year. A positive demand shock to household spending translates into a posi-
tive output gap and somewhat higher inflation peaking after about two to three 
years. Reacting to the expected inflation gap, the Riksbank, initially raises the repo 
rate (see figure 5.10).  As a result of the initial increase in the nominal interest rate, 
both real and nominal exchange rate appreciates and the real interest increases.  
Net export decrease, as the increases in domestic demand has a positive effect on im-
ports while exports fall in response to the initial appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Higher demand and production imply higher investment. However, investment is 
curbed somewhat by higher real interest rates.  
Higher domestic demand also implies that firms demand more labour. Hours worked 
increase initially and unemployment falls. The tighter labour market also leads to 
higher nominal and real wages. Higher real wages, lower unemployment and higher 
average hours worked imply a higher disposable income, which stimulates future con-
sumption. 
Two years after the initial demand shock the output gap is close to zero. This follows 
from the fact that consumption, investment and net export are curbed by the higher 
real rate of interest and by the stronger real exchange rate. 
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6  Conclusion 
Based on the assumption of forward-looking rationality of agents, economic theory 
imposes a number of powerful constraints on the behaviour of economic variables. 
KIMOD incorporates many prominent ideas of the modern macroeconomics of the 
neoclassical synthesis: forward-looking rationality of agents, adherence to neoclassical 
assumptions of production and investment technology, an explicitly modelled search 
framework for the labour market, money neutrality and superneutrality in the long 
run and the Blanchard – Yaari way of modelling finite life spans in an otherwise infi-
nite horizon model. In a model like KIMOD, the dynamic solution is computed back-
wards from the future and the interpretation of current and changing economic in-
formation is only possible against the “background” of a fully specified economic fu-
ture.  
In theoretical general equilibrium models, it is a natural benchmark to assume fully 
informed economic agents and fully flexible price setting, and the steady state of 
KIMOD is of course also based on these assumptions. As this documentation makes 
apparent, it is difficult or impossible to use such a long term model to mimic the 
short run behaviour of actual macroeconomic data. To generate model behaviour that 
resembles the real economy, a number of other restrictions have to be imposed. In 
this respect, the applied macro modeller has no generally accepted code of conduct to 
appeal to. Instead, ideas are adopted from the research literature on a somewhat ad 
hoc basis, with the aim of achieving the most progress in reconciling the model and 
economic reality with the least complicated and most plausible extra assumptions. In 
KIMOD, due to assumptions of imperfect information and bounded rationality, there 
are nominal rigidities in both price and wage setting. For example, there is sluggish 
price adjustment because only a part of all firms in each period undertake price revi-
sions. Furthermore, households’ expectations are partially adaptive.  
Moreover, KIMOD incorporates a search model of the labour market that by its very 
nature and without compromising any rationality assumption introduces a time-
consuming adjustment process, due to the realistic assumption that vacant jobs and 
unemployed workers cannot all meet instantaneously. The inclusion of a search model 
of the labour market in an otherwise neoclassical growth model is probably one com-
parative advantage of KIMOD. It generates a plausible model connection between the 
labour market and monetary policy and can be richly contrasted with labour market 
data, but it also introduces a small but welcome degree of freedom in an otherwise 
neoclassical growth model: with vacancy costs, total output need not be exactly ex- 
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hausted by labour and capital shares and there is some – though quantitatively lim-
ited – latitude in the model for short run fluctuations that would otherwise be diffi-
cult to reconcile with rigorous neoclassical assumptions.  By these means, the search 
process of the labour market becomes an intermediate production process, using va-
cancies and unemployed workers as inputs, that in turn produces the labour input 
used in the production of goods. 
A sophisticated macroeconomic model only thrives in an institutional environment 
that is geared to macroeconomic analyses. A model like KIMOD has a natural field of 
applications in policy simulations and shock simulations. Once there is a long term 
solution in place, it is “relatively” straightforward to simulate the effects of perma-
nent or transitory economic shocks on the main macroeconomic variables (cf. chapter 
5 on the dynamic properties of KIMOD). In addition to providing some interesting 
answers, the KIMOD exercise often compels the analyst to pose the economic ques-
tion in a sharp way. For example, from the point of view of a policymaker or eco-
nomic journalist, it seems like an innocent question to ask about the “effect of an 
interest rate increase of 50 points” or “the effect of a SEK 10 billions more expansive 
fiscal policy”. When such questions are be incorporated as alternative policies in 
KIMOD, the questions become anything but simple. In the case of an interest hike: 
what were the public's expectations of the hike? Is the hike part of a revised mone-
tary policy rule? If so, what is the underlying reason for the revision? Was it antici-
pated? Or is the hike a temporary shock due to, say, misleading current economic 
information or a temporary majority in the Central Bank Board? Different answers 
to such questions generate altogether different outcomes, and the merciless obligation 
to write down, in KIMOD, an exact specification for all of such cases can prompt a 
much more insightful view on the issue that has to be analysed.  
Besides simulation purposes, the institutional environments that demand sophisti-
cated macro modelling are most often also preoccupied with forecasting. This is also 
the case of KIMOD, since it has been designed and developed at the NIER. Yet the 
interplay with forecasters is by its nature challenging, since a model like KIMOD is 
by itself not particularly “clever” when it comes to interpreting the latest revisions of 
economic variables. As long as the KIMOD analyst is not provided with an interpre-
tation of the long term repercussions – if any – of a revision of a macroeconomic vari-
able, it is difficult to use that revision to generate interesting new information in 
KIMOD. 
This “interface” between the short term NIER forecast and the long term constraints 
imposed by KIMOD is one challenge of future work with KIMOD in a forecasting  
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environment. It is of course not the only one. To take one example, KIMOD with its 
about 80 endogenous variables is a fairly large economic model but still quite crude 
with respect to the hundreds and thousands economic variables that are routinely 
updated in a forecasting round. This is not a trivial problem of aggregation. For ex-
ample, economic reality consists of many production sectors (industries), some of 
which are on trends that may be expansive or contractive. If linearly projected in the 
future, some industries would dominate the economy and others would soon disap-
pear (and many do disappear in the course of time). In KIMOD, by contrast, any 
long term steady state must exhibit balanced growth with labour-augmenting techni-
cal change. To analyse real economies with real structural change by using a model 
that imposes balanced long term growth can lead to unforeseen technical problems.  
Of course, such problems are also an indispensable sign of vitality. A macro model 
that would become “complete” in the sense that it would not be in need of any fur-
ther developments would also die instantly, since it is only the process of improve-
ments and new challenges that sustains the curiosity and ability of the modelling 
team. Thus, the only worse thing than to have to struggle with modelling challenges 
is not to have to struggle with them at all. This truth should be appreciated by 
model builders and appliers, as well as any large organisation that embeds such activ-
ity: that sustaining a large scale macroeconomic model is not about designing a per-
fect tool that can easily be used by anyone, but rather about sustaining a research 
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8 Appendix A Figures and tables illustrating the 
dynamic model properties 
 
•  Figure 5.1: A 1 % permanent productivity shock 
•  Figure 5.2: A permanent labour supply shock 
•  Figure 5.3: A shock to the relative bargain strength of workers 
•  Figure 5.4: A permanent reduction in the ratio of government debt to GDP 
•  Figure 5.5: A 1 % permanent reduction in the Inflation target 
•  Figure 5.6: A 1% shock to the nominal wage 
•  Figure 5.7: A 1% shock to the nominal exchange rate 
•  Figure 5.8: A shock to the interest rate 
•  Figure 5.9: A temporary labour supply shock 
•  Figure 5.10: A 1% shock to private consumption 
 
•  Table 5.1: Impact on production, output gap and inflation after permanent 
shocks 
•  Table 5.2: Impact on the output gap and inflation after transitory shocks 
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Figure 5.1: A 1 % permanent productivity shock 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.1.a: Labour productivity   Figure 5.1.b: Capital stock  
Figure 5.1.c: Hours worked, private sector  Figure 5.1.d: Production, private sector 
Figure 5.1.e: Total production  Figure 5.1.f : Output gap and inflation    89
Figure 5.1: (continued) A 1 % permanent productivity shock 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.1.g: Real wage (level)  Figure 5.1.h: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.1.i: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.1.j: Nominal and real wages 
 
Figure 5.1.k: Export and import  
 
Figure 5.1.l: Private consumption and 
investment    90
Figure 5.2: A permanent labour supply shock 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.2.a: Labour supply, hours worked 
and unemployment rate 
Figure 5.2.b: Total production 
 
Figure 5.2.c: Hours worked, private sector  Figure 5.2.d: Production, private sector 
Figure 5.2.e: Capital stock, private sector 
 
Figure 5.2.f : Labour productivity, private 
sector   91
Figure 5.2: (continued) A permanent labour supply shock 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.2.g: Output gap and inflation  Figure 5.2.h: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.2.i: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.2.j: Real wage (level) 
 
Figure 5.2.k: Export and import 
 
Figure 5.2.l: Private consumption and 
investment   92
Figure 5.3: A shock to the relative bargain strength of workers 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.3.a: Labour supply, hours worked 
and unemployment rate 
Figure 5.3.b: Total production 
 
Figure 5.3.c: Hours worked, private sector  Figure 5.3.d: Production, private sector 
Figure 5.3.e: Capital stock, private sector 
 
Figure 5.3.f : Labour productivity, private 
sector   93
Figure 5.3: (continued) A shock to the relative bargain strength of workers 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.3.g: Output gap and inflation  Figure 5.3.h: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.3.i: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.3.j: Nominal and real wages 
 
Figure 5.3.k: Net export and government 
consumption 
Figure 5.3.l: Private consumption and 
investment   94
Figure 5.4: A permanent reduction in the ratio of government debt to GDP 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.4.a: Government debt to GDP  Figure 5.4.b: Total production 
Figure 5.4.c: Hours worked, private sector  Figure 5.4.d: Production, private sector 
Figure 5.4.e: Capital stock, private sector 
 
Figure 5.4.f : Labour productivity, private 
sector   95
Figure 5.4: (continued) a permanent reduction in the ratio of government debt to GDP 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.4.g: Real wage  
 
Figure 5.4.h: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.4.i: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.4.j: Output gap and inflation 
 
Figure 5.4.k: Net export and government 
consumption 
Figure 5.4.l: Private consumption and 
investment 96 
Figure 5.5: A 1 % permanent reduction in the Inflation target 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.5.a: Output gap and inflation 
(deviation from old target target)  
Figure 5.5.b: Nominal and real interest rate 
 
Figure 5.5.c: Labour market  Figure 5.5.d: Nominal and real wage 
Figure 5.5.e: Net export and government 
consumption 
Figure 5.5.f: Private consumption and 
investment 97 
Figure 5.5: (continued) A 1 % permanent reduction in the Inflation target 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.5.g: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.5.h: Inflation and expected 
inflation 98 
Figure 5.6: A 1% shock to nominal wages 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.6.a: Nominal wage 
 
Figure 5.6.b: Output gap and inflation 
(deviation target) 
Figure 5.6.c: Labour market  Figure 5.6.d: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.6.e: Net export and government 
consumption 
Figure 5.6.f: Private consumption and 
investment 99 
Figure 5.6: (continued) A 1% shock to nominal wages 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.6.g: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.6.h: Nominal and real wage 
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Figure 5.7: A 1% shock to the nominal exchange rate 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.7.a: Nominal exchange rate 
 
Figure 5.7.b: Output gap and inflation 
(deviation target) 
Figure 5.7.c: Labour market  Figure 5.7.d: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.7.e: Net export and government 
consumption 
Figure 5.7.f: Private consumption and 
investment 101 
Figure 5.7: (continued) A 1% shock to the nominal exchange rate 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.7.g: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.7.h: Nominal and real wage 
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Figure 5.8: A shock to the interest rate 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.8.a: Nominal interest rate 
 
Figure 5.8.b: Output gap and inflation 
(deviation target)  
Figure 5.8.c: Labour market  Figure 5.8.d: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.8.e: Net export and government 
consumption 
Figure 5.8.f: Private consumption and 
investment 103 
Figure 5.8: (continued) A shock to the interest rate 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.8.g: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.8.h: Nominal and real wage 
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Figure 5.9: A temporary labour supply shock 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.9.a: Labour supply 
 
Figure 5.9.b: Output gap and inflation 
(deviation target)  
Figure 5.9.c: Labour market  Figure 5.9.d: Nominal and real interest rate 
Figure 5.9.e: Net export and government 
consumption 
Figure 5.9.f: Private consumption and 
investment 105 
Figure 5.9: (continued) A temporary labour supply shock 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.9.g: Real and nominal exchange 
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Figure 5.10: A 1% shock to private consumption 
Responses in % 
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Figure 5.10: (continued) A 1% shock to private consumption 
Responses in % 
Figure 5.10.g: Real and nominal exchange 
rates, terms of trade 
Figure 5.10.h: Nominal and real wage 
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Table 5.1: Impact on production, output gap and inflation after permanent shocks 
Percent 
 Production
*  Output gap  Inflation 
gap 
Output gap  Inflation  
Shock     after 1 
year 
after 1 year  Max.effect
**  Max.effect
** 
Productivity 1.25 –0.06  –0.09  0.27(3)  –0.15(2) 




0.44 –0.17  –0.08  –0.17(1)  –0.15(3) 
Government 
debt to GDP 




0.00 –0.18  –0.40  –0.38(2)  –1.20(4) 
* The long-run effect on the production level 
**The figure in parentheses indicate after how many years the maximum effect occur 
** The inflation gap is compared to the old inflation target 
 
 
Table 5.2: Impact on output gap and inflation after transitory shocks 
Percent 
  Output gap  Inflation gap  Output gap  Inflation  
Shock   after 1 year  after 1 year  Max. effect
**  Max. effect
** 
Nominal wage  –0.08  0.43  –0.12(3)  0.43(1) 
Exchange rate  0.24  0.14  0.24(1)  0.18(3) 
Interest rate  –0.23  0.19  –0.41(2)  –0.27(3) 
Labour supply  0.15  –0.10  0.38(3)  –0.19(2) 
Private consumption  0.15  0.02  0.15(1)  0.08(3) 
** The figure in parentheses indicate after how many years the maximum effect occurs  
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9  Appendix B: Definition of variables and parameters 
In this appendix, variables and parameters are listed in alphabetical order. All vol-
umes are in real terms. Superscript “E”, “SS” and “FP” in the text concerns expecta-
tions, steady state and flex-price values, respectively, and are not repeated here.  
9.1  Variables 
F A   Foreign labour-augmenting productivity. 
GRF A   Growth factor, total factor productivity,  1 /
H H
tt A A − . 
H A  Labour-augmenting  productivity. 
P B   Bonds hold by the private sector. 
G B   Bonds hold by the government sector. 
BB  Budget surplus, government. 
BW  Bond  wealth. 
C  Private  consumption.   
F C   Foreign produced intermediate private consumption goods.  
H C   Home produced intermediate private consumption goods.  
CA Current  account. 
CORE Core  inflation. 
COST   Installation cost of capital plus vacancy costs. 
D Dividends. 
K f   Marginal product of capital. 
L f   Marginal product of labour. 
G   Government consumption.  
H G   Government consumption of home goods.  
HW  Human  wealth.  
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I  Total  investments.   
F I   Foreign produced intermediate investment goods. 
G I  Government  investments. 
H I   Home produced intermediate investment goods. 
P I   Private sector investments. 
IC   Investment cost in the private sector (
P I  plus installation cost of capi-
tal). 
K   Capital stock, whole economy. 
G K   Capital stock, government sector. 
P K   Capital stock, private sector. 
L  Employment, whole economy. 
G L   Employment, government sector. 
P L  Employment,  private  sector. 
LH   Hours worked, whole economy. 
G LH   Hours worked, government sector. 
P LH   Hours worked, private sector. 
LS   Labour supply in persons. 
M  Imports. 
MA  Number of successful matches at the labour market. 
MC  Marginal  cost. 
MPC   Marginal propensity to consume. 
MPL  Marginal product of labour. 
NER  Nominal exchange rate (depreciation implies an increase in NER). 
NR  Nominal interest rate (repo rate). 
F NR   Foreign nominal interest rate.  
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NW   Nominal hourly wage in the private sector.  
OS  Operating  surplus. 
P  Deflator,  GDP. 
C P   Deflator, private consumption. 
C PB   Deflator, private consumption (basic prices). 
F P   GDP deflator, rest of the world. 
G P  Deflator,  government  consumption. 
G PB   Deflator, government consumption (basic prices). 
I P  Deflator,  investments. 
M P  Deflator,  imports. 
, M F P   Deflator, foreign goods in foreign currency, exported to Sweden. 
X P  Deflator,  exports. 
_ CP P  Relative  price, 
C P /P . 
_ M P P  Relative  price, 
M P /P . 
YG PB   Deflator, government production (basic prices). 
YP PB   Deflator, private production (basic prices). 
YPG PB   Deflator, private gross production (basic prices). 
_ YPG P PB  Relative  price, 
YPG P /P . 
* π   Inflation target of the central bank. 
MC
π   Trend change in marginal costs, MC . 
NW
π   Trend change in nominal wages, NW . 
YPG
π   Trend inflation rate, 
YPG PB . 
q Tobin’s  q. 
R   Real interest rate. 
F R   Foreign real interest rate.  
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RER  Real exchange rate (depreciation implies an increase in RER). 
SW  Stock  wealth. 
TR Transfers. 
TW  Total  wealth. 
_ UL S  Unemployment  rate   
U   Number of unemployed persons. 
UH   Number of unemployed hours. 
i U   Utility of generation i. 
ULC   Unit labour cost. 
V  Value  of  shares. 
VA Number  of  vacancies. 
VC   Cost of hiring labour (vacancy costs). 
P W   Real hourly wage, private sector. 
X  Exports. 
F X   Foreign produced intermediate export goods. 
H X   Home produced intermediate export goods. 
NET X  Net  exports. 
Y   Gross domestic product (GDP). 
G Y   Production, government sector. 
P Y   Production, private sector. 
PG Y   Gross production, private sector (production plus installation and va-
cancy costs). 
YD Disposible  income.  
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9.2  Parameters 
α   Share (in percentage) of government hourly wage to the hourly wage in 
the private sector. 
β  Subjective  discount  factor. 
γ   Vacancy cost parameter. 
δ   Depreciation rate of capital. 
ζ   Replacement ratio in the unemployment insurance. 
C η   Productivity parameter in the production function of consumption goods. 
1 LH η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  backward looking expectations of demand for hours. 
2 LH η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  expected production in t when determining demand for 
hours in the private sector. 
3 LH η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  expected production in t+1 when determining demand 
for hours in the private sector. 
MA η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  unemployment in the matching function. 
1 NR η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  the  inflation target in the policy reaction function of the 
central bank. 
2 NR η   Elasticity w.r.t. lagged interest rate in the policy reaction function of the 
central bank. 
PBC η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  core  inflation of the private consumption deflator (basic 
prices). 
1 PBL η   Elasticity w.r.t. the forward looking part (dated in t) of private gross 
production deflator. 
2 PBL η   Elasticity w.r.t. the forward looking part (dated in t+1) of private gross 
production deflator. 
1 PBYPG η   Elasticity w.r.t. the equilibrium relative price in the forward looking part 
of private gross production deflator. 
2 PBYPG η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  backward looking expectations of private gross produc-
tion deflator.  
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3 PBYPG η   Elasticity w.r.t. the output gap of private gross production deflator. 
E P η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  backward looking part of the GDP-deflator expectation. 
1 PM η   Elasticity w.r.t. the backward looking part of the import deflator. 
2 PM η   Elasticity w.r.t. the output gap of the import deflator. 
YPG η   Elasticity w.r.t. capital in the production function of the private sector. 
1 RER η   Elasticity w.r.t. terms of trade in the real exchange rate equation. 
2 RER η   Elasticity w.r.t. productivity level (relative the rest of the world) in the 
real exchange rate equation. 
3 RER η  Elasticity  w.r.t.  net  foreign assets in the real exchange rate equation. 
ϑ   Labour market tightness,  / VA U . 
() J ϑ   Rate at which vacancies are filled,  / MAV A . 
λ   Installation cost (of capital) parameter. 
V Λ   The value of a vacancy for a firm. 
J Λ   The value of a filled vacancy for a firm. 
U Λ   The value of unemployment for an unemployed. 
E Λ   The value of a job for an unemployed. 
μ   Relative bargaining strength of workers. 
ν   Growth rate of labour supply. 
π   Probability of survival. 
Π Profits.   
s Separation  rate. 
C τ   Indirect tax, private consumption. 
E τ   Social security contributions by the firm (zero presently in KIMOD, in-
corporated in the labour income tax, 
W τ , instead). 
G τ   Indirect tax, government consumption. 
W τ   Tax on labour income.  
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Y τ   Tax wedge between real GDP at market and basic prices, respectively. 
PY τ   Tax wedge between nominal GDP at market and basic prices, respec-
tively. 
i φ   Share of total stocks hold by generation i. 
χ   Elasticity in the labour income tax equation. 
Ω Nash  product. 
MA Z   Constant i in the matching function (”matchning efficiency”). 
_ PMP Z   Constant in the real exchange rate equation. 116
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